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Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) UFAE and IAE Working Papers Contact information of
Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC): http://pareto.uab.cat More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this series, please contact
(Xavier Vila) Series handle: repec:aub:autbar
More pages of listings: 0 |1 |2 |3
1995
321.95 Ecological and Economic Distribution Conflicts by Martinez-Alier, J. & O'Connor, M.
320.95 Competition for Managers and Market Efficiency by Barros, F. & Macho-Stadler, M.
319.95 The Allocation of Residual Property Rights by Bhattacharyyya, S. & Singh, R.
318.95 Rubinstein Batgaining with Tow-Sided Options by Sakovics, J. & Ponsati, C.
317.95 Market Manipulations and the Weekend Effect by Palomino, F.
316.95 Assessing the Effects of Economic Integration on Growth and Welfare by de la Fuente,A.
315.95 Optimal Sectoral Shifts by Phelan, C. & Trejos, A.
314.95 Catch-up, Growth and Convergence in the OECD by de la Fuente, A.
313.95 Capital Structure and Product Market Behavior: An Examination of Plant Exit and Investment Decisions by Kovenock, D. & Phillips, G.M.
312.95 A Note on Cost Minimization in General Equilibrium Models by Brusco, S.
311.95 The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information by Kovenock, D. & de Vries, C.G.
310.95 Fiat Exchange in Finite Economies by Kovenock, D. & de Vries, C.G.
309.95 Growth Effects of Fiscal Policy under Altruism and Low Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution by Caballe, J.
308.95 On the Survival of Strictly Dominated Strategies in Large Populations by Palomino, F.
307.95 Innovation, 'Bank' Monitoring and Endogenous Development by de la Fuente, A. & Marin, J.M.
305.95 Social Learning and Rational Expectations by Vives, X..A.
304.95 Performance, Promotion, and the Peter Principle by Fairburn, J.A. & Malcomson, J.M.
303.95 Gross Worker Flows: How Does the Spanish Evidence Fit the Stylized Facts? by Antolin, P.
302.95 Spurious Multicointegration by Marmol,F.
301.95 What Happened to Job Search Behaviour in Spain During the Recovery Period (1987-1991)? by Antolin,P.
300.95 Games of Incomplete Information: The Inconsistent Case by Maschler, M.
299.95 the Failling Rate of Profit. Entry, Exit, and Coordination with Mixed Strategies by Vettas, N.
298.95 Cost Reducing Strategies by Gosalbez, M.P.
297.95 The Hound of the Baskervilles: Natural Resources in Marx's Explination of the Failling Rate of Profit by Petith, H.C.
296.95 Entrepreneurs, Optimism, and the Competitive Edge by Manove, M.
295.95 An Experimental Test of the Crowding Out Hypothesis: The Nature of Beneficient Behavior by Bolton, G. & Katok, E.
294.95 The Empirics of Growth and Convergence: A Selective Review by de la Fuente, A.
293.95 Convex and Concave Transportations Costs in Spatial Competition by Hamoud, h. & Jarque, X.
292.95 Notes on a Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions by Barbera, S.
291.95 Maket versus Limit Orders in an Imperfectly Competitive Security Market by Adan, L.A.M.
290.95 Optimal Auditing when Some Individuals are Tax-return Exempt by Macho-Stadler, I. & Perez-Castillo, D.
285.95 Price Advertising and Coupons in a Monopoly Market by Caminal, R.
284.95 On the Concept of Weak Sustainability by Gutes, M.C.
273.94 Semi-Nonparametric Distribution-Free Dichotomous Choice Contingent Valuation by Creel, M. & Loomis, J.
1994 1993 223.93 Unions, Governments, Price Level and Unemployment by Sorolla, V.
222.93 Federal Fiscal Constitutions ; Part I: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard by Persson, T. & Tabellini, G.
221.93 On the Measurement of Polarization by Esteban, J. & Ray, D.
219.93 Structural Stability of Planar Hamiltonian Polynomial Vector Fields by Jarque, X. & Llibre, J.
218.93 A Note on Random Preferences and Welfare Estimation by Greel, M.D.
217.93 Welfare Estimation Using the Fourier Form: Simulation Evidence for the Recreation Demand Case by Greel, M.D.
216.93 The Role of Information in Licensing Contract Design by Macho, I. & Martinez-Giralt, X. & Perez-Castrillo, D.
215.93 Nominal Rigidities when Agents Care About Aggregate Demand by Bet-Mansour, A.E.
214.93 Bargaining with Non Stationary Preferences by Burgos, A.
209.93 Competition and Cooperation within a Multidivisional Firm by Fauli-Oller, R.
208.93 Two Systems of Wage Setting by Sorolla, V.
207.93 Short-Term Investment and the Informational Efficiency of the Market by Vives, X.
206.93 Learning from Others by Vives, X.
205.93 Financial Intermediation with Proprietary Information by Bhattacharya, S.
204.93 Weak Lower Subdifferentiability in Fractional Programming by Boncompte, M. & Martinez-Legaz, J.E.
203.93 After all Hotelling Was (Almost) Right by Garella, P.G. & Martinez-Giralt, X.
201.93 Information Structures and the Delegation of Monitoring by Olivella, P.
1992 200.92 Voting Under Constraints by Barbera, S. & Masso, J. & Neme, A.
198.92 The Cost Function and the Non-Neutrality of money: A Note by Bet-Mansour, A.E.
197.92 Bargaining at Variable Rythms by Martinez, X. & Ponsati, C.
196.92 Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-Proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems by Alcalde, J. & Barberà, S.
195.92 Learning and Convergence to Rational Expectations with Persistent Shocks by Jun, B. & Vives, X.
194.92 Mediation Is Necessary for Efficient Bargaining by Ponsati, C. & Sakovics, J.
193.92 Competition for Deposits, Risk of Failure, and Regulation in Banking by Matutes, C. & Vives, X.
192.92 Why Do Market Shares Matters? An Information-Based Theory by Vives, X. & Ramon, C.
187.92 Equilibrium Assignment of Players in Team Matches : game Theory for Tennis Coaches by Hamilton, J. & Romano, R.
186.92 The Separation and Timing of Allocation and Distribution in Second-Best Economies by Hamilton, J. & Slutsky, S.
185.92 Optimal Rental of Durable with Learning by Using by Burguet, R.
184.92 Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees by Barbera, S. & Gul, F. & Stacchetti, E.
183.92 Revolution and Triumph of Capitalism as Alternative Outcomes in a Marxian Growth Model with Decreasing Returns by Petith, H.C.
182.92 Efficient Monetary Equilibrium : An Overlapping Generations Model with Nonstationary Monetary Policies by Esteban, J. & Mitra, T. & Ray, D.
181.92 Costly Transfer Institutions and the Core in an Overlapping Generations Models by Esteban, J. & Engineer, M. & Sakovics, J.
180.92 Instability in the Labour Market for Researchers by Perez-Castrillo, J.D.
179.92 Centralized and Decentralized Contracts in a Moral Hazad Environment by Perez-Castrillo, J.D. & Macho-Stadler, I.
178.92 Coase vs. Pacman: Who Eats Whom in the Durable Goods Monopoly? by Von Der Fehr, N.H.M. & Kuhn, K.U.
177.92 Coalitional Manipulations in an State-Sharing Problem by Casado, M.A.F.
176.92 A Note on Reserve Requirements and Public Finance by Caminal, R. & Bacchetta, P.
175.92 International Fiscal Policy Games with Aggregate Demand Spillovers by Caminal, R. & Pages, C.
174.92 The Speed of Information Revelation in a Financial Market Mechanism by Vives, X.
173.92 Information Sharing and Tax Competition Among Governments by Bacchetta, P. & Paz Espinosa, M.
172.92 Intertemp[oral Transfer Institutions by Esteban, J.M. & sakovics, J.
171.92 On the Measurement of Polarization by Esteban, J.M. & Ray, D.
170.92 An Entropy Formula for Class of Circule Maps by Alseda, L. & Falco, A.
169.92 Exploitation and the Falling Rate of Profit in a marxian Growth Model with Decreasing Returns by Petith, H.C.
168.92 A Subgame-Perfect Implementable Social Choice Correspondebnce Failing to Be Nash Implementable by Sertel, M.R. & Yilmaz, B.
167.92 Social Indifference Curves with Optimal Second-Bast Taxation by Brito, D. & Hamilton, J. & Slutsky, S.
166.92 A Menu Cost Model of the International Transmission of Monetary Policy by Bet-Mansour, A.E.
165.92 Cooperative Outcomes Through Non-Cooperative Games by Peraz-Castrillo, J.
164.92 Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Games with Recommended Play by Macleod, B. & Brandts, J.
1991 191.92 Edgeworth and Modern Oligopoly Theorem by Vives, X.
190.92 Multiplier Analysis with Flexible Cost Functions by Sancho, F.
189.92 Modeling Proces in a Sam Structure by Roland-Holst, D.W. & Sancho, F.
188.92 Ralative Income Determination in the United States: A Social Accounting Perspective by Roland-Holst, D.W. & Sancho, F.
163.91 Algebraic Properties of Effectivity Functions by Gurvich, V.A.
162.91 Tight Cyclic Game Forms by Gurvich, V.A. & Golberg, A.I.
161.91 Little Perfection and Complexity by Neme, A.
160.91 Axiomatic Characterizations of the Duality Correspondence in Theory by Martinez-Legaz, J-E.
159.91 Equilibrium Payoffs of Dynamic Games by Masso, J. & Neme, A.
158.91 Endogeneous Growth, Human Capital and Bequests in a Life-Cycle Model by Caballe, J.
157.91 Protective Behaviour in Matching Models by Barbera, S. & Dutta, B.
156.91 Duality Between Direct and Indirect Preferences by Martinez-Legaz, J-E. & Santos, M.S.
153.91 Bonuses and Penalties as Equilibrium Incentive Devices, with Application to Manufacturing Systems by Olivella, P. & Aron, D.J.
152.91 The Dedline Effect: A Theoretical Note by Obiols, C.P.
1990 155.91 Resale-Proof Trades of Information by Nakayama, M. & Quintas, L. & Muto, S.
154.91 Stable Payoffs in Resale-Proof Trades of Information by Nakayama, M. & Quintas, L.
151.91 Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Bargaining Over Many Issues by Obiols, C.P.
150.91 Compromise VS Capitulation in a Simple Model of Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete Information by Obiols, C.P.
149.90 A Game-Theoretic Approach to Plant Pollination: Pollinator-Scarce VS. Pollinator-Abundant Contexts by Vega-Redondo, F. & Dafni, A.
148.90 A Game-Theoretic Model of Predator-Prey Signalling. by Vega-Redondo, F. & Hasson, O.
147.90 Strategic Market Processes in an Evolutionary Context by Vega-Redondo, F.
146.90 Technological Change and Institutional Inertia; A Co-Evolutionary Model with Two Hierarchical Levels by Vega-Redondo, F.
145.90 Technological Change and Path Dependence: A Co-Evolutionary Model on a Directed Graph by Vega-Redondo, F.
144.90 The Functioning of Cooperatives Under Renegotioation. by Ray, D.
143.90 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Repeated Games with Cost of Implementation by Neme, A. & Quintas, L.
142.90 Bundling Subscription TV Channels by Chae, S.
141.90 Insights or Forecasting? An Evaluation of a Simple CGE Model of Spain by Polo, C. & sancho, F.
140.90 An Analysis of Spain's Integration in the EEC by Polo, C. & sancho, F.
139.90 Dominance and Forward Induction: Experimental Evidence by Brandt, J. & Holt, C.A.
138.90 A general Equilibrium Approach to trade and Industrial Policy : The Case of Spain by Polo, C. & Roland-Holst, D. & Sancho, F.
137.90 Market Versus Limit Orders by Caballe, J.
136-90 Basing Point Pricing: Competition Versus Collusion by Thisse, J-F. & Vives, X.
135-90 How Fast Do Rational Agents Learn? by Vives, X.
134-90 Memory Startegies In Nonatomic Repeated Games by Masso, J.
1989 133-90 Information Control In Simultaneous Moves Games by Olivella, P.
132.90 Insider Trading and asset Pricing in an Imperfectly Competitive Multi- Secrity Market by Caballe, J. & Krishnan, M.
130.90 Evidence of risk Premia in Foreign Currency Futures Markets by McCurdy, T.H. & Morgan, I.G.
129.90 Implementation in economies with a Continuum of Agents by Vives, X. & Mas-Colell, A.
128-89 Ecological And Economic Valuation by Martinez-Alier, J.
127-89 Differentiability And Comparative Analysis In Discrete-Time Infinite-Horizon Optimization Problems by Santos, M.S.
126-89 Optimal Leasing With Learning And Commitment by Verde, R.B.
125-89 Collusion By Asymmetricaly Informed Firms by Kihlstrom, R. & Vives, X.
124-89 Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria In Continuous Time Games by Bergin, J. & Macleod, B.
123-89 Fair Division Under Joint Ownership: Recent Results And Open Problems by Moulin, H.
122-89 Autoregressive Models With Sudden Variance Changes At Unknown Points by Inclan, C.
121-89 Eficiency And Renegotiation In Repeated Games by Bergin, J. & Macleod, B.
120-89 Welfare Bounds And Fair Allocation Of Private Goods by Moulin, H.
119-89 Smoothness Of Policy Function In Discrete Time Economic Models by Santos, M.S.
118-89 Forward Induction: Experimental Evidence From Two-Stage Games With Complete Information by Brandts, J. & Holt, C.A.
117-89 Uniform Externalities: Two Axioms For Fair Allocation by Moulin, H.
116-89 Optimal Labor Contracts With Non-Contractible Human Capital by Kanemoto, Y. & Macleod, B.
114.89 Wage Premiums And Profit Maximization In Efficiency Wage Models by Macleod, W.B. & Malcomson, J.M.
113-89 Labour Turnover And The Natural Rate Of Unemployment: Efficiency Wage V.S Frictional Unemployment by Macleod, B.W. & Malcomson, J.M.
108-89 An Evolutionary Model Of Technological Change by Redondo, F.V.
1988 115-89 The Contribution Of Publicity Provided Inputs To The State'S Economies by Garcia-Mila, T. & Mcguire, T.J.
112-89 Smoothness Of Policy Function In Continuous Time Economic Models: The One Dimensional Case by Santos, M.S. & Vila, J-L.
111-89 Entry, Sunk Costs And Renegotiation In Duopoly by Macleod, W.B. & Bergin, J.
110-89 Spacial Competition And The Core by Hamilton, J.H. & Macleod, W.B. & Thisse, J-F.
109-89 Dynamical Systems That Solve Continuous-Time Concave Optimization Problems Anything Goes by Montrucchio, L.
107-88 Nash Equilibrium With Strategic Complementarities by Vives, X.
106-88 Welfare Bounds In The Fair Division Problem by Moulin, H.
105.88 Collusion By Asymmetrically Informed Duopolists by Vives, X. & Kihlstrom, R.E.
104-88 On Brand Proliferation With Vertical Differentiation by Giralt, X.M.
103-88 Configurations Of Fans And Nests Of Limit Cycles For Polynomial Vector Fields In The Plane by Llibre, J. & Cima, A.
102-88 Bounded Polynomial Vectro Fields by Cima, A. & Llibre, J.
101-88 Algebraic And Topological Classification If The Homogeneous Cubic Vector Fields In The Plane by Cima, A. & Llibre, J.
100-88 Information And Competitive Advantage by Vives, X.
99-88 Public Projects And Private Contributions by Vega, F.
98-88 Bayesian Boundedly Rational Agents Play The Finitely Repeated Prisoner'S Dilemma by Vega, F.
97-88 An Extension Of The Tevelation Principle by Burguet, R.
96-88 Security Retrading On New Information In Incomplete Market by Chae, S.
95-88 Voting By Quota And Committee by Barbera, S. & Sonnenschein, H.
94.88 Strong Egalitarian Allocations by Dutta, B. & Ray, D.
91.88 Strategy-Proof Voting Schemes With Continuous Preferences by Barbera, S. & Peleg, B.
90.88 Inflation And Optimal Price Adjustment Under Monopolistic Competition by Caminal, R.
89.88 Social Welfare And Equality by Dutta, B. & Esteban, J.
88.88 Nash Equilibria And Collusive Effects Through Price Dispersion In Duopolies by Lal, R. & Matutes, C.
87.88 Social Insurance And Population Uncertainty: Demographic Bias And Implications For Social Security by Brandts, J. & Bartolome, C.A.M.
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