Freedom of Choice as Control over Outcomes
AbstractAs interactions between individuals are introduced into the freedom of choice literature by the mean of game forms, new issues appear. In particular, in this paper it is argued that individuals face uncertainty with respect to outcomes as they lose the control they implicitely exert over options in the opportunity set framework. A criterion is proposed as to compare alternative game forms in terms of the control they offer to individuals. The CardMin criterion suggests that any game form should be judged on the basis of the strategy offering the lowest number of pairwise different outcomes. An axiomatic characterization is provided in the case of two individuals.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 704.07.
Date of creation: 10 Jun 2007
Date of revision:
Freedom of Choice; Control; Axiomatic; Game Forms;
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