This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-2007-01-28 (All new papers)
• NEP-BEC-2007-01-28 (Business Economics)

1. Alan S. Blinder & Don H. Choi, 1989. "A Shred of Evidence on Theories of Wage Stickiness," NBER Working Papers 3105, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Blinder, Alan S & Choi, Don H, 1990. "A Shred of Evidence on Theories of Wage Stickiness," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(4), pages 1003-15, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. David Masclet, 2002. "Peer Pressure in Work Teams : The effects of Inequity Aversion," Post-Print halshs-00178476_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
3. Dirk Engelmann & Martin Strobel, 2004. "Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 857-869, September. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Engelmann,Dirk & Strobel,Martin, 2002. "Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments," Research Memoranda 015, Maastricht : MERIT, Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology. [Downloadable!]
4. Hideshi Itoh, 2004. "Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 55(1), pages 18-45. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2001. "Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity," Discussion Papers in Economics 14, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
6. Andreoni, James & Miller, John H., 2008. "Analyzing Choice with Revealed Preference: Is Altruism Rational?," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • James Andreoni & John H Miller, 2001. "Analyzing Choice with Revealed Preference: Is Altruism Rational," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000096, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
7. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "Fairness, Incentives, and Contractual Choices," IEW - Working Papers iewwp020, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2000. "Fairness, incentives, and contractual choices," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 1057-1068, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2002. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series 1042, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2001. "Understanding Social Preferences With Simple Tests," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 21-01, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
   • Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2003. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," General Economics and Teaching 0303002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   • Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2002. "Understanding Social Preferences With Simple Tests," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(3), pages 817-869, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Antonio Cabrales & Antoni Calvó, 2002. "Social Preferences and Skill Segregation," Economics Working Papers 629, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
10. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1988. "Subgame Perfect Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1191-1220, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Dufwenberg, Martin & Kirchsteiger, Georg, 2000. "Reciprocity and wage undercutting," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 1069-1078, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Englmaier, Florian & Wambach, Achim, 2002. "Contracts and Inequity Aversion," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Englmaier, Florian & Achim Wambach, 2003. "Contracts and Inequity Aversion," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 74, Royal Economic Society. [Downloadable!]
13. Ma, Ching-to & Moore, John & Turnbull, Stephen, 1988. "Stopping agents from "cheating"," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 355-372, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Cox, James C. & Friedman, Daniel & Gjerstad, Steven, 2007. "A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 17-45, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • James C. Cox & Daniel Friedman & Steven Gjerstad, 2006. "A Tractable Model of Reciprocity and Fairness," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2006-05, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. [Downloadable!]
    • Cox, J. & Friedman, D. & Gjerstad, S., 2006. "A Trackable Model of Reciprocity and Fairness," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1181, Purdue University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • James Cox & Daniel Friedman & Steven Gjerstad, 2004. "A Tractable Model of Reciprocity and Fairness," Experimental 0406001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
15. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 2003. "Inequity Aversion in Tournaments," Cahiers de recherche 0322, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 2003. "Inequity Aversion in Tournament," CIRANO Working Papers 2003s-18, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
16. Robert Dur & Amihai Glazer, 2004. "Optimal Incentive Contracts when Workers envy their Boss," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-046/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 13 Jun 2006. [Downloadable!]
17. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
18. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications," IEW - Working Papers iewwp075, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2001. "Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications," CEPR Discussion Papers 2703, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Ernst Fehr & Klaus Schmidt, 2000. "Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity -- Evidence and Economic Applications," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
19. Pedro Rey Biel & Steffen Huck, 2005. "Endogenous Leadership in Teams," Microeconomics 0506004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Steffen Huck & Pedro Rey-Biel, 2006. "Endogenous Leadership in Teams," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(2), pages 253-261, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
20. Gary E. Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
21. repec:att:wimass:19199814 is not listed on IDEAS
22. Mookherjee, Dilip, 1984. "Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(3), pages 433-46, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
23. Campbell, Carl M, III & Kamlani, Kunal S, 1997. "The Reasons for Wage Rigidity: Evidence from a Survey of Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(3), pages 759-89, August.
24. Jonas Agell, 2004. "Why are Small Firms Different? Managers' Views," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 106(3), pages 437-452, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Küpper, Hans-Ulrich & Sandner, Kai, 2008. "Differences in Social Preferences - Are They Profitable for the Firm?," Discussion Papers in Business Administration 2122, University of Munich, Munich School of Management. [Downloadable!]
2. Bartling, Björn & Siemens, Ferdinand von, 2007. "Equal Sharing Rules in Partnerships," Discussion Papers in Economics 2027, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
3. Robert Dur & Amihai Glazer, 2004. "Optimal Incentive Contracts when Workers envy their Boss," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-046/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 13 Jun 2006. [Downloadable!]
4. Jianpei Li, 2009. "Team production with inequity-averse agents," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 119-136, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Alexander K. Koch & Eloïc Peyrache, 2008. "Aligning Ambition and Incentives," Economics Working Papers 2008-16, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Koch, Alexander K. & Peyrache, Eloïc, 2005. "Aligning Ambition and Incentives," IZA Discussion Papers 1527, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
   • Alexander K. Koch & Eloic Peyrache, 2005. "Aligning Ambition and Incentives," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 05/03, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Mar 2005. [Downloadable!]
6. Robert A. J. Dur & Amihai Glazer, 2004. "Optimal Incentive Contracts For a Worker Who Envies His Boss," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
7. Björn Bartling & Ferdinand von Siemens, 2006. "The Intensity of Incentives in Firms and Markets: Moral Hazard with Envious Agents," Discussion Papers 115, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
8. Sabrina Teyssier, 2007. "Optimal Group Incentives with Social Preferences and Self-Selection," Working Papers 0710, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
9. Sabrina Teyssier, 2007. "Optimal Group Incentives with Social Preferences and Self-Selection," Post-Print halshs-00144901_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
10. Sandner, Kai, 2008. "Balancing Performance Measures When Agents Behave Competitively in an Environment With Technological Interdependencies," Discussion Papers in Business Administration 2112, University of Munich, Munich School of Management. [Downloadable!]
11. Bartling, Björn & Siemens, Ferdinand von, 2006. "The Intensity of Incentives in Firms and Markets: Moral Hazard with Envious Agents," Discussion Papers in Economics 913, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
12. Antonio Cabrales & Raffaele Miniaci & Marco Piovesan & Giovanni Ponti, 2008. "Social Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty: An Experiment on Markets and Contracts," Discussion Papers 08-06, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Antonio Cabrales & Raffaele Miniaci & Marco Piovesan & Giovanni Ponti, 2009. "Social Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty: An Experiment on Markets and Contracts," Working Papers 2009-09, FEDEA. [Downloadable!]