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Inequity aversion and team incentives Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Pedro Rey Biel (University College London)
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We study optimal contracts when employees are averse to inequity as modelled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). A ''selfish'' employer can profitably exploit preferences for equity among his employees by offering contracts which create maximum inequity off-equilibrium and thus, leave employees feeling envy or guilt when they do not produce the optimal output level. We show how the optimal contract is designed such that the subgame played by the employees is dominance solvable, and thus, a unique optimal level of production is implemented. We also discuss conditions for inequity aversion to affect the optimal output choice. Similar results are obtained for other types of distributional preferences such status-seeking or efficiency concerns.
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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Microeconomics with number
0407009.
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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 16 Jul 2004Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0407009Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 30Contact details of provider: Web page: http://129.3.20.41
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Keywords: Principal>035Principal
; agent ; inequity aversion ; team incentives ; behavioral contract theory ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
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