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Optimal Incentive Contracts under Inequity Aversion

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  • Englmaier, Florian

    ()
    (University of Munich)

  • Wambach, Achim

    ()
    (University of Cologne)

Abstract

We analyze the Moral Hazard problem, assuming that agents are inequity averse. Our results differ from conventional contract theory and are more in line with empirical findings than standard results. We find: First, inequity aversion alters the structure of optimal contracts. Second, there is a strong tendency towards linear sharing rules. Third, it delivers a simple rationale for team based incentives in many environments. Fourth, the Sufficient Statistics Result is violated. Dependent on the environment, optimal contracts may be either overdetermined or incomplete.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 1643.

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Length: 47 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2005
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, 69 (2), 312-328
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1643

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Keywords: inequity aversion; sufficient statistics result; incentives; linear contracts; contract theory; incomplete contracts;

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