Fairness, Reciprocity, and Wage Rigidity
AbstractThis paper contains a review of work on wage rigidity. The work includes field studies, and economic experiments, and psychological surveys. Economists have done the field studies and experiments, and management scientists and experimental psychologists have done the surveys.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1383.
Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: 01 Oct 2002
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-11-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2002-11-18 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2002-11-18 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-LTV-2002-11-04 (Unemployment, Inequality & Poverty)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter & Georg Kirchsteiger, 1997.
"Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence,"
Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 833-860, July.
- Georg Kirchsteiger & Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, 1997. "Reciprocity as a contract enforcement device: experimental evidence," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/5911, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Fehr, Ernst & Kirchsteiger, George & Riedl, Arno, 1993.
"Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 108(2), pages 437-59, May.
- Georg Kirchsteiger & Ernst Fehr & Arno Riedl, 1993. "Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/5927, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Fehr, Ernst & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Riedl, Arno, 1993. "Does fairness prevent market clearing? An experimental investigation," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-16460, Maastricht University.
- Joseph G. Altonji & Paul J. Devereux, 1999.
"The Extent and Consequences of Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity,"
NBER Working Papers
7236, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Devereux, Paul J. & Altonji, Joseph G., 2000. "The extent and consequences of downward nominal wage rigidity," Open Access publications from University College Dublin urn:hdl:10197/311, University College Dublin.
- Fehr, Ernst & Klein, Alexander & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2001.
"Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2790, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ernst Fehr & Alexander Klein & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness," IEW - Working Papers 072, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Ernst Fehr & Alexander Klein & Klaus Schmidt, 2001. "Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness," CESifo Working Paper Series 445, CESifo Group Munich.
- Fehr, Ernst & Klein, Alexander & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2001. "Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness," Discussion Papers in Economics 18, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Burda, M. & GÃ¼th, W. & Kirchsteiger, G. & Uhlig, H.F.H.V.S., 1998.
"Employment Duration and Resistance to Wage Reductions: Experimental Evidence,"
1998-073, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Michael Burda & Werner Güth & Georg Kirchsteiger & Harald Uhlig, 2005. "Employment Duration and Resistance to Wage Reductions: Experimental Evidence," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 22, pages 169-189.
- Burda, Michael C. & Güth, Werner & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Uhlig, Harald, 1998. "Employment duration and resistance to wage reductions: Experimental evidence," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1998,74, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
- repec:wop:humbsf:1998-74 is not listed on IDEAS
- Libich, Jan & Stehlík, Petr, 2010. "Incorporating rigidity and commitment in the timing structure of macroeconomic games," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 767-781, May.
- Jean-Pierre Danthine & André Kurmann, 2005.
"The Macroeconomic Consequences of Reciprocity in Labor Relations,"
Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du DÃ©partement d'EconomÃ©trie et d'Economie politique (DEEP)
05.08, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
- Jean-Pierre Danthine & André Kurmann, 2008. "The Macroeconomic Consequences of Reciprocity in Labor Relations," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 109(4), pages 857-881, 03.
- Jean-Pierre Danthine & André Kurmann, 2005. "The Macroeconomic Consequences of Reciprocity in Labor Relations," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000299, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Danthine, Jean-Pierre & Kurmann, Andre, 2005. "The Macroeconomic Consequences of Reciprocity in Labour Relations," CEPR Discussion Papers 5174, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Jorge M. Streb, 2006. "Job market signals and signs," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 326, Universidad del CEMA.
- Jean-Pierre DANTHINE & André KURMANN, 2004. "Efficiency Wages Revisited: The Internal Reference Perspective (new version)," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du DÃ©partement d'EconomÃ©trie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 04.09, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP, revised Jun 2005.
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