Cooperation, Harassment, and Involuntary Unemployment: An Insider-Outsider Approach
AbstractWe present a theory of involuntary unemployment which explains why the unemployed workers ("outsiders") are unable or unwilling to find jobs even though they are prepared to work for less than the prevailing wages of incumbent workers ("insiders"). The outsiders do not underbid the insiders since, were they to do so, the insiders would withdraw cooperation from them and make their work unpleasant (i.e. "harass" them), thereby reducing the productivity and increasing the reservation wages of the underbidders. The resulting labor turnover costs create economic rent which the insiders tap in wage-setting and, as a result, involuntary unemployment may arise.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 196.
Date of creation: Sep 1987
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Other versions of this item:
- Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J, 1988. "Cooperation, Harassment, and Involuntary Unemployment: An Insider-Outsider Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(1), pages 167-88, March.
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