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Cooperation, Harassment, and Involuntary Unemployment: An Insider-Outsider Approach

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Author Info
Lindbeck, Assar
Snower, Dennis J

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Abstract

The authors present a theory of involuntary unemployment which explains why the unemployed workers ("outsiders" ) are unable or unwilling to find jobs even though they are prepared to work for less than the prevailing wages of incumbent workers ("in siders"). The outsiders do not underbid the insiders since, were the y to do so, the insiders would withdraw cooperation from them, making their work unpleasant with harassment, and thereby reducing the prod uctivity and increasing the reservation wages of the underbidders. Th e resulting labor-turnover costs create economic rent which the insid ers tap in wage setting and, as a result, involuntary unemployment ma y arise. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 78 (1988)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 167-88
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:78:y:1988:i:1:p:167-88

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  1. Anabela Carneiro & Pedro Portugal, 2006. "Market Power, Dismissal Threat and Rent Sharing: The Role of Insider and Outsider Forces in Wage Bargaining," IZA Discussion Papers 2102, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  2. John W. Budd & Josef Konings & Matthew J. Slaughter, 2002. "International Rent Sharing in Multinational Firms," NBER Working Papers 8809, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, . "Why Social Preferences Matter - The Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition," IEW - Working Papers iewwp084, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
  4. Mari Rege and Kjetil Telle, 2001. "An Experimental Investigation of Social Norms," Discussion Papers 310, Research Department of Statistics Norway. [Downloadable!]
  5. David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald & Mario D. Garrett, 1990. "Insider Power in Wage Determination," NBER Working Papers 3179, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. John W. Budd & Jozef Konings & Matthew J. Slaughter, 2002. "Wages and International Rent Sharing in Multinational Firms," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 522, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Kai-Uwe Kuuhn & A. Jorge Padilla, 2002. "Union Power, Replacement and Labour Market Dynamics," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(479), pages 317-343, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Harry J. Holzer & Edward B. Montgomery, 1990. "Asymmetries and Rigidities in Wage Adjustments by Firms," NBER Working Papers 3274, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Truman F. Bewley, 2002. "Fairness, Reciprocity, and Wage Rigidity," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1383, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  10. David G. Blanchflower, 1991. "Fear, Unemployment and Pay Flexibility," NBER Working Papers 3365, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Ernst Fehr & Georg Kirchsteiger, 2003. "Insider Power, Wage Discrimination, and Fairness," Labor and Demography 0305003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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