Consumption Commitments and Employment Contracts
AbstractWe examine an economy in which the cost of consuming some goods can be reduced by making commitments that reduce flexibility. We show that such consumption commitments can induce consumers with risk-neutral underlying utility functions to be risk averse over small variations in income, but sometimes to seek risk over large variations. As a result, optimal employment contracts will smooth wages conditional on being employed, but may incorporate a possibility of unemployment. Copyright 2008, Wiley-Blackwell.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal The Review of Economic Studies.
Volume (Year): 75 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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Other versions of this item:
- Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson & Dan Silverman, 2006. "Consumption Commitments and Employment Contracts," PIER Working Paper Archive 06-028, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 07 Dec 2006.
- Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson & Dan Silverman, 2006. "Consumption Commitments and Employment Contracts," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000145, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson & Dan Silverman, 2001. "Consumption Commitments and Employment Contracts," PIER Working Paper Archive 06-002, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 14 Jan 2006.
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
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