Preferences for risk in a dynamic model with consumption commitments
Abstractthe consumers who start saving in order to increase consumption of the commitment good in the future become risk lovers. We also argue that such behavior is likely to arise due to the presence of borrowing constraints; therefore suggesting that in the economies with consumption commitments borrowing constraints can make uninsured risk desirable (in contrast, it is known that in standard models borrowing constraints increase the cost of uninsured risk).
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2007 Meeting Papers with number 567.
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Christian Zimmermann Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis PO Box 442 St. Louis MO 63166-0442 USA
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/society.htm
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson & Dan Silverman, 2001.
"Consumption Commitments and Employment Contracts,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
06-002, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 14 Jan 2006.
- Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson & Dan Silverman, 2006. "Consumption Commitments and Employment Contracts," PIER Working Paper Archive 06-028, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 07 Dec 2006.
- Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson & Dan Silverman, 2006. "Consumption Commitments and Employment Contracts," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000145, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Athreya, Kartik B., 2002. "Welfare implications of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(8), pages 1567-1595, November.
- Galina Vereshchagina & Hugo A. Hopenhayn, 2009.
"Risk Taking by Entrepreneurs,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1808-30, December.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Zimmermann).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.