Endogenous Leadership in Teams

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Endogenous Leadership in Teams

Author Info

Pedro Rey Biel (University College London)
Steffen Huck (University College London)

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Abstract

In this paper we study the mechanics of ``leading by example'' in teams. Leadership is beneficial for the entire team when agents are conformists, i.e., dislike effort differentials. We also show how leadership can arise endogenously and discuss what type of leader benefits a team most.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Microeconomics with number 0506004.

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Length: 9 pages
Date of creation: 08 Jun 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0506004

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 9
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Article
- Steffen Huck & Pedro Rey-Biel, 2006. "Endogenous Leadership in Teams," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(2), pages 253-261, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2005-06-14 (All new papers)
NEP-BEC-2005-06-14 (Business Economics)
NEP-CBE-2005-06-14 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
NEP-GTH-2005-06-14 (Game Theory)
NEP-LAB-2005-06-14 (Labour Economics)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Oriana Bandiera (STICERD & LSE, 2004. "Relative and Absolute Incentives: Evidence on Worker Productivity," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 277, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Bandiera, Oriana & Barankay, Iwan & Rasul, Imran, 2004. "Relative and Absolute Incentives: Evidence on Worker Productivity," CEPR Discussion Papers 4431, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Armin Falk & Andrea Ichino, 2004. "Clean Evidence on Peer Effects," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000439, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Armin Falk & Andrea Ichino, 2006. "Clean Evidence on Peer Effects," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 39-58, January. [Downloadable!]
Hamilton, Jonathan H. & Slutsky, Steven M., 1990. "Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 29-46, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Hamilton, J.H. & Slutsky, S.M., 1988. "Endogenous Timing In Duopoly Games: Stackelberg Or Cournot Equilibria," Papers 88-4, Florida - College of Business Administration.
Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," IEW - Working Papers iewwp004, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1998. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers 1812, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory Of Fairness, Competition, And Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Hermalin, Benjamin E, 1998. "Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership: Leading by Example," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1188-1206, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Ben Hermalin, 1996. "Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership: Leading by Example," Working Papers _006, University of California at Berkeley, Haas School of Business. [Downloadable!]
- Benjamin E. Hermalin, 1997. "Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership: Leading by Example," Microeconomics 9612002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
van Damme, Eric & Hurkens, Sjaak, 1999. "Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 105-129, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Eric van Damme & Sjaak Hurkens, 1996. "Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership," Economics Working Papers 190, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]

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This page was last updated on 2008-8-27.

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