IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jeborg/v60y2006i1p100-111.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Allowing for two production periods in the Cournot duopoly: Experimental evidence

Author

Listed:
  • Muller, Wieland

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Muller, Wieland, 2006. "Allowing for two production periods in the Cournot duopoly: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 100-111, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:60:y:2006:i:1:p:100-111
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167-2681(05)00087-9
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
    2. Saloner, Garth, 1987. "Cournot duopoly with two production periods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 183-187, June.
    3. Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2002. "To Commit or Not to Commit: Endogenous Timing in Experimental Duopoly Markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 240-264, February.
    4. van Damme, Eric & Hurkens, Sjaak, 1999. "Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 105-129, July.
    5. Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2001. "Stackelberg Beats Cournot: On Collusion and Efficiency in Experimental Markets," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(474), pages 749-765, October.
    6. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
    7. Axel Ockenfels & Gary E. Bolton, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March.
    8. Dorothea Kübler & Georg Weizsäcker, 2004. "Limited Depth of Reasoning and Failure of Cascade Formation in the Laboratory," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 71(2), pages 425-441.
    9. Holt, Charles A, 1985. "An Experimental Test of the Consistent-Conjectures Hypothesis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 314-325, June.
    10. Nagel, Rosemarie, 1995. "Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1313-1326, December.
    11. Hamilton, Jonathan H. & Slutsky, Steven M., 1990. "Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 29-46, March.
    12. Deneckere, Raymond J & Kovenock, Dan & Lee, Robert, 1992. "A Model of Price Leadership Based on Consumer Loyalty," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(2), pages 147-156, June.
    13. van Damme, Eric & Hurkens, Sjaak, 1999. "Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 105-129, July.
    14. Ellingsen, Tore, 1995. "On flexibility in oligopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 83-89, April.
    15. Spencer, Barbara J. & Brander, James A., 1992. "Pre-commitment and flexibility : Applications to oligopoly theory," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 1601-1626, December.
    16. Costa-Gomes, Miguel & Crawford, Vincent P & Broseta, Bruno, 2001. "Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1193-1235, September.
    17. Pal, Debashis, 1996. "Endogenous Stackelberg Equilibria with Identical Firms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 81-94, January.
    18. Miguel Fonseca & Steffen Huck & Hans-Theo Normann, 2005. "Playing Cournot although they shouldn’t," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 25(3), pages 669-677, April.
    19. Raymond J. Deneckere & Dan Kovenock, 1992. "Price Leadership," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 143-162.
      • Raymond Deneckere & Dan Kovenock, 1988. "Price Leadership," Discussion Papers 773, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    20. Matsumura, Toshihiro, 1999. "Quantity-setting oligopoly with endogenous sequencing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 289-296, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Hinloopen, Jeroen & Müller, Wieland & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2014. "Output commitment through product bundling: Experimental evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 164-180.
    2. Leufkens, Kasper & Peeters, Ronald, 2011. "Price dynamics and collusion under short-run price commitments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 134-153, January.
    3. Miguel A. Fonseca, 2019. "Endogenous Price Leadership with Asymmetric Costs: Experimental Evidence," Studies in Microeconomics, , vol. 7(1), pages 59-74, June.
    4. Hildenbrand, Andreas, 2013. "Is a firm a firm? A Stackelberg experiment," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 7, pages 1-26.
    5. Till Requate & Israel Waichman, 2011. "“A profit table or a profit calculator?” A note on the design of Cournot oligopoly experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 14(1), pages 36-46, March.
    6. Max Albert & Andreas Hildenbrand, 2016. "Industrial Organization and Experimental Economics: How to Learn from Laboratory Experiments," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 135-156, August.
    7. Santos-Pinto, Luís, 2008. "Making sense of the experimental evidence on endogenous timing in duopoly markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(3-4), pages 657-666, December.
    8. Schubert, Jens, 2015. "The impact of forward contracting on tacit collusion: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 109-123.
    9. Meickmann, Felix C., 2023. "Cooperation in knowledge sharing and R&D investment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 211(C), pages 146-164.
    10. Raimo P. Hämäläinen & Ilkka Leppänen, 2017. "Cheap talk and cooperation in Stackelberg games," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 25(2), pages 261-285, June.
    11. Hinloopen, Jeroen & Müller, Wieland & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2014. "Output commitment through product bundling: Experimental evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 164-180.
    12. Hildenbrand, Andreas, 2010. "Cournot or Stackelberg competition? A survey on experimental evidence," MPRA Paper 24468, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Miguel Fonseca & Wieland Müller & Hans-Theo Normann, 2006. "Endogenous timing in duopoly: experimental evidence," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(3), pages 443-456, October.
    2. Santos-Pinto, Luís, 2008. "Making sense of the experimental evidence on endogenous timing in duopoly markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(3-4), pages 657-666, December.
    3. Daniele Nosenzo & Martin Sefton, 2011. "Endogenous Move Structure and Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Theory and Experiment," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(5), pages 721-754, October.
    4. Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2002. "To Commit or Not to Commit: Endogenous Timing in Experimental Duopoly Markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 240-264, February.
    5. Miguel A. Fonseca, 2019. "Endogenous Price Leadership with Asymmetric Costs: Experimental Evidence," Studies in Microeconomics, , vol. 7(1), pages 59-74, June.
    6. Daniele Nosenzo & Martin Sefton, 2011. "Endogenous Move Structure and Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Theory and Experiment," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(5), pages 721-754, October.
    7. Hildenbrand, Andreas, 2010. "Cournot or Stackelberg competition? A survey on experimental evidence," MPRA Paper 24468, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Attila Tasnádi, 2016. "Endogenous timing of moves in Bertrand–Edgeworth triopolies," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 12(4), pages 317-334, December.
    9. Hildenbrand, Andreas, 2013. "Is a firm a firm? A Stackelberg experiment," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 7, pages 1-26.
    10. Kubler, Dorothea & Muller, Wieland, 2002. "Simultaneous and sequential price competition in heterogeneous duopoly markets: experimental evidence," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(10), pages 1437-1460, December.
    11. Shakun Datta Mago & Emmanuel Dechenaux, 2009. "Price leadership and firm size asymmetry: an experimental analysis," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 12(3), pages 289-317, September.
    12. Engelmann, Dirk & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2007. "An experimental test of strategic trade policy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 144-156, September.
    13. Breitmoser, Yves, 2012. "On the endogeneity of Cournot, Bertrand, and Stackelberg competition in oligopolies," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 16-29.
    14. Daniel Carvalho & Luís Santos-Pinto, 2014. "A cognitive hierarchy model of behavior in the action commitment game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(3), pages 551-577, August.
    15. Mouraviev, Igor & Rey, Patrick, 2011. "Collusion and leadership," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 705-717.
    16. Pedro Rey Biel, 2005. "Equilibrium Play and Best Response in Sequential Constant Sum Games," Experimental 0506004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Daniel Carvalho & Luis Santos-Pinto, 2010. "A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Behavior in Endogenous Timing Games," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 10.06, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    18. van Damme, Eric & Hurkens, Sjaak, 1999. "Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 105-129, July.
    19. van Damme, Eric & Hurkens, Sjaak, 2004. "Endogenous price leadership," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 404-420, May.
    20. Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 2001. "Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1402-1422, December.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:60:y:2006:i:1:p:100-111. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.