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Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership

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Author Info
Eric van Damme
Sjaak Hurkens

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Abstract

We consider a linear quantity setting duopoly game and analyze which of the players will commit when both players have the possibility to do so. To that end, we study a 2-stage game in which each player can either commit to a quantity in stage 1 or wait till stage 2. We show that committing is more risky for the high cost firm and that, consequently, risk dominance considerations, as in Harsanyi and Selten (1988), allow the conclusion that only the low cost firm will choose to commit. Hence, the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous Stackelberg leader.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 190.

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Date of creation: Nov 1996
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Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:190

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Related research
Keywords: Duopoly; Stackelberg; equilibrium selection;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Pal, Debashis, 1991. "Cournot duopoly with two production periods and cost differentials," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 441-448, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384.
  3. Hamilton, Jonathan H. & Slutsky, Steven M., 1990. "Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 29-46, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. A. Michael Spence, 1979. "Investment Strategy and Growth in a New Market," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 1-19, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Mailath George J., 1993. "Endogenous Sequencing of Firm Decisions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 169-182, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Steve Dowrick, 1986. "von Stackelberg and Cournot Duopoly: Choosing Roles," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 251-260, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1983. "Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 227-250, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Eric van Damme & Sjaak Hurkens, 1998. "Endogenous Price Leadership," Economics Working Papers 289, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Sadanand, Asha & Sadanand, Venkatraman, 1996. "Firm Scale and the Endogenous Timing of Entry: a Choice between Commitment and Flexibility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 516-530, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Saloner, Garth, 1987. "Cournot duopoly with two production periods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 183-187, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Sadanand, V. & Green, E.J., 1991. "Firm Scale and the Endogenous Timing of Entry : A Choice Between Commitment and Flexibility," Working Papers 1991-11, University of Guelph, Department of Economics.
  12. Ellingsen, Tore, 1995. "On flexibility in oligopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 83-89, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Spencer, Barbara J. & Brander, James A., 1992. "Pre-commitment and flexibility : Applications to oligopoly theory," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 1601-1626, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Sadanand, V. & Green, E.J., 1991. "Firm Scale and the Endogenous Timing of Entry : A Choice Between Commitment and Flexibility," Working Papers 1991-11, University of Guelph, Department of Economics.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Blonski, Matthias & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2003. "Prisoners' Other Dilemma," CEPR Discussion Papers 3856, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Andrea Gallice, 2008. "Preempting versus Postponing: the Stealing Game," ICER Working Papers 02-2008, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Björnerstedt, Jonas & Westermark, Andreas, 2006. "Bargaining and Strategic Discrimination," Working Paper Series 2006:6, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Pedro Rey Biel & Steffen Huck, 2005. "Endogenous Leadership in Teams," Microeconomics 0506004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Guillaume Haeringer & Sophie Bade & Ludovic Renou, 2006. "Bilateral Commitment," Working Papers 2006.75, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Fonseca, Miguel A. & Mueller, Wieland & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2005. "Endogenous timing in duopoly: experimental evidence," Discussion Paper 77, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  7. W. Güth, . "Robust Learning Experiments -Evidence for Learning and Deliberation-," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 2000-82, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
  8. Gueth, Werner & Mueller, Wieland & Potters, Jan, 2005. "Endogenous preemption on both sides of a market," Discussion Paper 92, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Eric Rasmusen & Young-Ro Yoon, 2007. "First versus Second-Mover Advantage with Information Asymmetry about the Size of New Markets," Caepr Working Papers 2007-017, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Pedro Rey Biel, 2005. "Equilibrium Play and Best Response in Sequential Constant Sum Games," Experimental 0506004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  11. Peter Bardsley & Quan Nguyen, 2005. "Rent Seeking and Judicial Bias in Weak Legal Systems," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 925, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
  12. Muller, W., 2003. "Allowing for two production periods in the cournot duopoly: experimental evidence," Discussion Paper 42, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Zhou, J., 2007. "In Litigation: How Far do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead?," Discussion Paper 2007-002, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Steffen Huck & Wieland Müller & Hans-Theo Normann, 1999. "To commit or not to commit: Endogenous timing in experimental duopoly markets," Experimental 9906002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Gueth, W. & Ritzberger, K. & Damme, E. van, 2002. "On the Nash bargaining solution with noise," Discussion Paper 79, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  16. Leandro Arozamena & erico Weinschelbaum, 2008. "Simultaneous vs. Sequential Price Competition with Incomplete Information," Department of Economics Working Papers 2008_3, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. [Downloadable!]
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  17. Marko Köthenbürger, 2008. "How Do Local Governments Decide on Public Policy in Fiscal Federalism? Tax vs. Expenditure Optimization," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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