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Cournot or Stackelberg competition? A survey on experimental evidence

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  • Hildenbrand, Andreas

Abstract

In this survey, I look into experimental studies on duopolistic quantity competition with homogeneous products and duopolistic price competition with heterogeneous products. The focus is on the sequence of competition. That is, I summarize and analyze experimental studies checking Cournot competition against Stackelberg competition. I find that while Stackelberg equilibrium outcomes are seldom under quantity competition, under price competition, the Stackelberg equilibrium prediction seems to be more appropriate. However, after discussing the experimental setups, I conclude that some methodological problems are present. Moreover, I make recommendations for further research.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 24468.

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Date of creation: 17 Aug 2010
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:24468

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Keywords: Cournot competition; simultaneous competition; simultaneous play; Stackelberg competition; sequential competition; sequential play; duopoly; homogeneous products; heterogeneous products; experiemtal economics;

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Cited by:
  1. Andreas Hildenbrand, 2012. "Is a “Firm” a Firm? A Stackelberg Experiment," MAGKS Papers on Economics, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung) 201229, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  2. Max Albert & Andreas Hildenbrand, 2012. "Industrial organization in the laboratory," MAGKS Papers on Economics, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung) 201205, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).

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