Preempting versus Postponing: the Stealing Game

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Preempting versus Postponing: the Stealing Game

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Gallice, Andrea

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Andrea Gallice

Abstract

We present an endogenous timing game of action commitment in which players can steal from each other parts of a homogeneous and perfectly divisible pie (market). We show how the incentives to preempt or to follow the rivals radically change with the number of players involved in the game. In the course of the analysis we also introduce, discuss and apply the concept of pu-dominance, a generalization of the risk-dominance criterion to games with more than two players.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 10256.

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Date of creation: Sep 2008
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:10256

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2008-09-05 (All new papers)
NEP-GTH-2008-09-05 (Game Theory)
NEP-MIC-2008-09-05 (Microeconomics)

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van Damme, Eric & Hurkens, Sjaak, 2004. "Endogenous price leadership," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 404-420, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
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Other versions:
- Hamilton, J.H. & Slutsky, S.M., 1988. "Endogenous Timing In Duopoly Games: Stackelberg Or Cournot Equilibria," Papers 88-4, Florida - College of Business Administration.
Paul Klemperer & Jeremy Bulow, 1999. "The Generalized War of Attrition," Game Theory and Information 9901004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
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van Damme, Eric & Hurkens, Sjaak, 1996. "Commitment Robust Equilibria and Endogenous Timing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 290-311, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Van Damme, E. & Hurkens, S., 1993. "Commitment Robust Equilibria and Endogenous Timing," Papers 9356, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
Morris, Stephen & Rob, Rafael & Shin, Hyun Song, 1995. "Dominance and Belief Potential," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 145-57, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
van Damme, Eric & Hurkens, Sjaak, 1999. "Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 105-129, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Eric van Damme & Sjaak Hurkens, 1996. "Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership," Economics Working Papers 190, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
Andreas Park & Lones Smith, 2006. "Caller Number Five: Timing Games that Morph from One Form to Another," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1554, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Andreas Park & Lones Smith, 2004. "Caller Number Five: Timing Games that Morph From One Form to Another," 2004 Meeting Papers 871, Society for Economic Dynamics. [Downloadable!]

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