The objective of this paper is to re-evaluate the attitude to effort of a risk-averse decision- maker in an evolving environment. In the classic analysis, the space of efforts is generally discretized. More realistic, this new approach emploies a continuum of effort levels. The pres- ence of multiple possible efforts and performance levels provides a better basis for explaining real economic phenomena. In the context of a Principal-agent relationship, not only the incentives of the Principal can determine the private agent to exert a good effort, but also the evolution of the dynamic system. The dynamic incentives can be ineffective when the environment does not sufficiently incite the agent to allocate effort. This possible scenario explains why some efficient strategic incentive-compatible constraints that cover the entire period of contract do not generally exist. The proposed approach offers an elegant study of the close relationship between effort, attitude, and behavior, in the case of a risk-averse decision-maker.
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Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number
739.08.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Cantor, Richard M, 1988.
"Work Effort and Contract Length,"
Economica,
London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 55(219), pages 343-53, August.
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