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Scoring Rules on Dichotomous Preferences

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Author Info
Marc Vorsatz ()

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Abstract

In this paper, we study individual incentives to report preferences truthfully for the special case when individuals have dichotomous preferences on the set of alternatives and preferences are aggregated in form of scoring rules. In particular, we show that (a) the Borda Count coincides with Approval Voting on the dichotomous preference domain, (b) the Borda Count is the only strategy-proof scoring rule on the dichotomous preference domain, and (c) if at least three individuals participate in the election, then the dichotomous preference domain is the unique maximal rich domain under which the Borda Count is strategy-proof.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 617.04.

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Length: 23
Date of creation: 09 Aug 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:617.04

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Related research
Keywords: Approval Voting; Borda Count; Dichotomous Preferences; Social Choice Function;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Voting by Committees," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 595-609, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Michael Dummett, 1998. "The Borda count and agenda manipulation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 289-296. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Saari, Donald G, 1990. " Susceptibility to Manipulation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 21-41, January.
  4. David A. Smith, 1999. "Manipulability measures of common social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 639-661. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Berga, Dolors & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2000. "Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules with One Public Good," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 39-61, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Ching, Stephen & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 1998. "A Maximal Domain for the Existence of Strategy-Proof Rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 157-166, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C. & Merrill, Samuel III, 1987. "The Responsiveness of Approval Voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen," Working Papers 87-18, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
  8. Martin Barbie & Clemens Puppe & Attila Tasnádi, 2006. "Non-manipulable domains for the Borda count," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 411-430, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve & Stong, Richard, 2005. "Collective choice under dichotomous preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 165-184, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Marc Vorsatz, 2004. "Approval Voting ion Dichotomous Preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 619.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
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