This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Information Networks and Worker Recruitment

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Jordi Brandts ()
Arthur Schram ()
Klarita Gërxhani ()

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper studies experimentally how the existence of social information networks affects the ways in which firms recruit new personnel. Through such networks firms learn about prospective employees' performance in previous jobs. Assuming individualistic preferences social networks are predicted not to affect overall labor market behavior, while with social preferences the prediction is that when bilaterally negotiated: (i) wages will be higher and (ii) that workers in jobs with incomplete contracts will respond with higher effort. Our experimental results are consistent with the social preferences view, both for the case of excess demand and excess supply of labor. In particular, the presence of information networks leads to more efficient allocations.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://pareto.uab.es/wp/2007/70707.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 707.07.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 42
Date of creation: 15 Jun 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:707.07

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 08193, Bellaterra, Barcelona
Phone: 34 93 592 1203
Web page: http://pareto.uab.cat
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Xavier Vila).

Related research
Keywords: Labor Markets Information Networks Worker Recruitment Indirect reciprocity Experiments

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General
J40 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - General

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Martin Brown & Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr, 2004. "Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(3), pages 747-780, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Javier Suarez & Samuel Bentolila & Claudio Michelacci, 2004. "Social Contacts and Occupational Choice," 2004 Meeting Papers 593, Society for Economic Dynamics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Lindeboom, Maarten & van Ours, Jan C & Renes, Gusta, 1994. "Matching Employers and Workers: An Empirical Analysis on the Effectiveness of Search," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(1), pages 45-67, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Georg Kirchsteiger, 2003. "Does Learning Lead to Coordination in Market Clearing Institutions?," Vienna Economics Papers 0319, University of Vienna, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. van Ours, Jan & Ridder, Geert, 1992. "Vacancies and the Recruitment of New Employees," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 10(2), pages 138-55, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Tibor Neugebauer & Anders Poulsen & Arthur J.H.C. Schram, 2002. "Fairness and Reciprocity in the Hawk-Dove Game," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 02-094/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Calvo-Armengol, Antoni, 2004. "Job contact networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 191-206, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Holzer, Harry J, 1988. "Search Method Use by Unemployed Youth," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 6(1), pages 1-20, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Ingrid Seinen & Arthur Schram, 2001. "Social Status and Group Norms," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 01-003/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  11. Davis, Douglas D. & Harrison, Glenn W. & Williams, Arlington W., 1993. "Convergence to nonstationary competitive equilibria : An experimental analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 305-326, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Albrecht, James W & Axell, Bo, 1984. "An Equilibrium Model of Search Unemployment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(5), pages 824-40, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Bontemps, Christian & Robin, Jean-Marc & van den Berg, Gerard J, 2000. "Equilibrium Search with Continuous Productivity Dispersion: Theory and Nonparametric Estimation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(2), pages 305-58, May.
    Other versions:
  14. Falk, Armin & Fehr, Ernst, 2003. "Why labour market experiments?," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 399-406, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Gary E. Bolton & Elena Katok & Axel Ockenfels, 2003. "How Effective are Electronic Reputation Mechanisms? An Experimental Investigation," Working Paper Series in Economics 3, University of Cologne, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  16. Gary E. Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness, 2004. "Do Labour Market Conditions Affect Gift Exchange? Some Experimental Evidence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(497), pages 684-708, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Milgrom, Paul R, 1988. "Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization Design," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 42-60, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  19. Fehr, Ernst & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Riedl, Arno, 1998. "Gift exchange and reciprocity in competitive experimental markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-34, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  20. Holt, Charles A & Langan, Loren W & Villamil, Anne P, 1986. "Market Power in Oral Double Auctions," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(1), pages 107-23, January.
  21. Burdett, Kenneth & Mortensen, Dale T, 1980. "Search, Layoffs, and Labor Market Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(4), pages 652-72, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  22. Montgomery, James D, 1991. "Social Networks and Labor-Market Outcomes: Toward an Economic Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1407-18, December.
  23. Gorter, Cees & van Ommeren, Jos, 1999. "Sequencing, Timing and Filling Rates of Recruitment Channels," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 31(10), pages 1149-60, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Fehr, Ernst & Kirchsteiger, George & Riedl, Arno, 1993. "Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(2), pages 437-59, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  25. R. Lynn Hannan & John H. Kagel & Donald V. Moser, 2002. "Partial Gift Exchange in an Experimental Labor Market: Impact of Subject Population Differences, Productivity Differences, and Effort Requests on Behavior," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(4), pages 923-951, October. [Downloadable!]
  26. van Ours, Jan & Ridder, Geert, 1991. "Cyclical variation in vacancy durations and vacancy flows : An empirical analysis," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 1143-1155, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  27. Piet Rietveld & Cees Gorter & Peter Nijkamp & Giovanni Russo, 2000. "Recruitment channel use and applicant arrival: An empirical analysis," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 673-697. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  28. McCall, John J, 1970. "Economics of Information and Job Search," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(1), pages 113-26, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  29. Scott A. Boorman, 1975. "A Combinatorial Optimization Model for Transmission of Job Information through Contact Networks," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 6(1), pages 216-249, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  30. Gorter, Cees & Nijkamp, Peter & Rietveld, Piet, 1993. "The Impact of Employers' Recruitment Behaviour on the Allocation of Vacant Jobs to Unemployed Job Seekers," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 251-69.
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Cannot find something on IDEAS? Encourage the publisher to index it! Instructions.

This page was last updated on 2008-8-20.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.