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Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game

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Author Info
Dirk Engelmann
Urs Fischbacher

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Abstract

We study indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. At any time only half of the subjects can build a reputation. This allows us to study both pure indirect reciprocity that is not contaminated by strategic reputation building and the impact of incentives for strategic reputation building on the helping rate. We find that while pure indirect reciprocity appears to be important, the helping choice seems to be influenced at least as much by strategic considerations. Strategic do better than non-strategic players and non-reciprocal do better than reciprocal players, casting doubt on previously proposed evolutionary explanations for indirect reciprocity.

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Paper provided by The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague in its series CERGE-EI Working Papers with number wp215.

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Date of creation: Jul 2003
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Handle: RePEc:cer:papers:wp215

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Keywords: indirect reciprocity reputation experimental economics

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C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Dufwenberg, M. & Kirchsteiger, G., 1998. "A theory of sequential reciprocity," Discussion Paper 37, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2002. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series 1042, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Claudia Keser, 2002. "Trust and Reputation Building in E-Commerce," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-75, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  4. Fehr, Ernst & Kirchsteiger, George & Riedl, Arno, 1993. "Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(2), pages 437-59, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Gary Bolton & Elena Katok & Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "How Effective are Online Reputation Mechanisms?," Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-25, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  6. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory Of Fairness, Competition, And Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. David K. Levine, 1998. "Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiment," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 1(3), pages 593-622, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Ingrid Seinen & Arthur Schram, 2001. "Social Status and Group Norms," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 01-003/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  9. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Harbaugh, William T, 1998. "The Prestige Motive for Making Charitable Transfers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 277-82, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Kirchsteiger, Georg & Sebald, Alexander, 2006. "Investments into Education - Doing as the Parents Did," CEPR Discussion Papers 5686, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Dirk Engelmann & Dorothea Kübler, 2007. "Do Legal Standards Affect Ethical Concerns of Consumers?," IZA Discussion Papers 3266, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Ben Greiner & Maria Vittoria Levati, 2003. "Indirect Reciprocity in Cyclical Networks - An Experimental Study -," Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction 2003-15, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Alexander K. Koch & Hans-Theo Normann, 2005. "Giving in Dictator Games: Regard for Others or Regard by Others?," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 05/09, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Aug 2005. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Maroš Servátka, 2007. "Does Generosity Generate Generosity? An Experimental Study of Reputation Effects in a Dictator Game," Working Papers in Economics 07/03, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Dirk Engelmann & Veronika Grimm, 2006. "Overcoming Incentive Constraints? The (In-)effectiveness of Social Interaction," Working Paper Series in Economics 22, University of Cologne, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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