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Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game

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  • Dirk Engelmann
  • Urs Fischbacher

Abstract

We study indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. At any time only half of the subjects can build a reputation. This allows us to study both pure indirect reciprocity that is not contaminated by strategic reputation building and the impact of incentives for strategic reputation building on the helping rate. We find that while pure indirect reciprocity appears to be important, the helping choice seems to be influenced at least as much by strategic considerations. Strategic do better than non-strategic players and non-reciprocal do better than reciprocal players, casting doubt on previously proposed evolutionary explanations for indirect reciprocity.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague in its series CERGE-EI Working Papers with number wp215.

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Date of creation: Jul 2003
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Handle: RePEc:cer:papers:wp215

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Keywords: indirect reciprocity; reputation; experimental economics;

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References

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  1. Charness, Gary B & Rabin, Matthew, 2001. "Understanding Social Preferences With Simple Tests," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt0dc3k4m5, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  2. Dufwenberg, M. & Kirchsteiger, G., 1998. "A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity," Discussion Paper 1998-37, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  3. Claudia Keser, 2002. "Trust and Reputation Building in E-Commerce," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-75, CIRANO.
  4. Gary Bolton & Elena Katok & Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "How Effective are Online Reputation Mechanisms?," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-25, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  5. Fehr, Ernst & Kirchsteiger, George & Riedl, Arno, 1993. "Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(2), pages 437-59, May.
  6. Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1998. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers 1812, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. David K. Levine, 1998. "Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiment," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 1(3), pages 593-622, July.
  8. Falk, Armin & Fischbacher, Urs, 2001. "A Theory of Reciprocity," CEPR Discussion Papers 3014, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Ingrid Seinen & Arthur Schram, 2001. "Social Status and Group Norms," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 01-003/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  10. Harbaugh, William T, 1998. "The Prestige Motive for Making Charitable Transfers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 277-82, May.
  11. Seinen, Ingrid & Schram, Arthur, 2006. "Social status and group norms: Indirect reciprocity in a repeated helping experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 581-602, April.
  12. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
  13. Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July.
  14. Andreoni, James & Petrie, Ragan, 2004. "Public goods experiments without confidentiality: a glimpse into fund-raising," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(7-8), pages 1605-1623, July.
  15. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
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Cited by:
  1. Dirk Engelmann & Veronika Grimm, 2006. "Overcoming Incentive Constraints? The (In-)effectiveness of Social Interaction," Working Paper Series in Economics 22, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
  2. Leonardo Becchetti & Stefano Castriota & Pierluigi Conzo, 2012. "Calamity, Aid and Indirect Reciprocity: the Long Run Impact of Tsunami on Altruism," CEIS Research Paper 239, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 06 Jul 2012.
  3. Robert Gazzale & Tapan Khopkar, 2011. "Remain silent and ye shall suffer: seller exploitation of reticent buyers in an experimental reputation system," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 273-285, May.
  4. Alexander K. Koch & Hans-Theo Normann, 2008. "Giving in Dictator Games: Regard for Others or Regard by Others?," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 223-231, July.
  5. Kirchsteiger, Georg & Sebald, Alexander, 2010. "Investments into education--Doing as the parents did," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(4), pages 501-516, May.
  6. Sarah Jacobson & Ragan Petrie, 2012. "Favor Trading in Public Good Provision," Working Papers 1032, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
  7. Greiner, Ben & Vittoria Levati, M., 2005. "Indirect reciprocity in cyclical networks: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 711-731, October.
  8. Nikolaos Georgantz�s & Constantine Manasakis & Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2008. "Strategic delegation in experimental duopolies with endogenous incentive contracts," Working Papers 0809, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
  9. Charness, Gary & Du, Ninghua & Yang, Chun-Lei, 2011. "Trust and trustworthiness reputations in an investment game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 361-375, June.
  10. Dirk Engelmann & Dorothea Kübler, 2008. "Do Legal Standards Affect Ethical Concerns of Consumers?," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2008-008, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  11. Charlotte Klempt, 2012. "The Impact of Random Help on the Dynamics of Indirect Reciprocity," IAW Discussion Papers 88, Institut für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung (IAW).
  12. Maroš Servátka, 2007. "Does Generosity Generate Generosity? An Experimental Study of Reputation Effects in a Dictator Game," Working Papers in Economics 07/03, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
  13. Luca Stanca & Luigino Bruni & Marco Mantovani, 2009. "The Effect of Motivations on Social Indirect Reciprocity: an Experimental Analysis," Working Papers 169, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2009.
  14. Luca Stanca, 2011. "Social science and neuroscience: how can they inform each other?," International Review of Economics, Springer, vol. 58(3), pages 243-256, September.
  15. Danz, David & Engelmann, Dirk & Kübler, Dorothea, 2012. "Do Legal Standards Affect Ethical Concerns of Consumers? An Experiment on Minimum Wages," Working Papers 12-03, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.

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