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Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Dirk Engelmann
Urs Fischbacher
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We study indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. At any time only half of the subjects can build a reputation. This allows us to study both pure indirect reciprocity that is not contaminated by strategic reputation building and the impact of incentives for strategic reputation building on the helping rate. We find that pure indirect reciprocity exists, but also that the helping decisions are substantially a!ected by strategic considerations. We find that the behavioral pattern can best be captured by non-selfish preferences as assumed by reciprocity models. Finally, we find that strategic do better than non-strategic players and non-reciprocal do better than reciprocal players, casting doubt on previously proposed evolutionary explanations for indirect reciprocity.
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Paper provided by Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz in its series TWI Research Paper Series with number
34.
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Date of creation: 2008Date of revision:
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Keywords: indirect reciprocity ; reputation ; experimental economics ; Other versions of this item:
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