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Fairness and reciprocity in the Hawk-Dove Game

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  • Neugebauer, Tibor
  • Poulsen, Anders
  • Schram, Arthur

Abstract

We study fairness and reciprocity in a Hawk-Dove Game. A variety of recent models gives the same predictions for this game. This allows us to provide a general classification of individuals' types. Contrary to a large number of studies of different games over the last decade, we observe a large group of subjects behaving in a self-interested way and observe only little reciprocity.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 66 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 243-250

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:66:y:2008:i:2:p:243-250

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References

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  1. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2000. "Social Preferences: Some Simple Tests and a New Model," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1483, Econometric Society.
  2. Georg Kirchsteiger & Martin Dufwenberg, 2004. "A theory of sequential reciprocity," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/5899, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  3. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2003. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," General Economics and Teaching 0303002, EconWPA.
  4. Glen W. Harrison & Jack Hirshleifer, 1998. "An experimental evaluation of weakest link/best shot models of public goods," Levine's Working Paper Archive 299, David K. Levine.
  5. Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2001. "Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity," Discussion Papers in Economics 14, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  6. Armin Falk & Urs Fischbacher, . "A Theory of Reciprocity," IEW - Working Papers 006, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  7. Charness, Gary B & Brandts, Jordi, 1998. "Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt4kx7d5pv, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  8. Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness, 2000. "Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 227-238, March.
  9. Axel Ockenfels & Gary E. Bolton, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March.
  10. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocitys," IEW - Working Papers 040, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Benedikt Herrmann & Henrik Orzen, 2008. "The appearance of homo rivalis: Social preferences and the nature of rent seeking," Discussion Papers 2008-10, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  2. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00395939 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Siegfried Berninghaus & Stephan Schosser & Bodo Vogt, 2013. "Equilibrium Selection under Limited Control - An Experimental Study of the Network Hawk-Dove Game," Jena Economic Research Papers 2013-048, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
  4. Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Ott, Marion, 2012. "Forward-looking behavior in Hawk–Dove games in endogenous networks: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 35-52.
  5. Jordi Brandts & Arthur Schram & Klarita Gërxhani, 2007. "Information Networks and Worker Recruitment," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 707.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  6. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00741973 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Ryan Oprea & Keith Henwood & Daniel Friedman, 2010. "Separating the Hawks from the Doves: Evidence from Continuous Time Laboratory Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 3129, CESifo Group Munich.
  8. Verena Utikal & Urs Fischbacher, 2009. "On the attribution of externalities," TWI Research Paper Series 46, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
  9. Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Nathalie Etchart-Vincent, 2013. "Wording and gender effects in a Game of Chicken. An explorative experimental study," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00796708, HAL.
  10. Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Nathalie Etchart-Vincent, 2012. "The puzzle of cooperation in a game of chicken: An experimental study," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00636089, HAL.
  11. Holden, Stein & Bezu, Sosina, 2014. "Are Wives less Selfish than their Husbands? Evidence from Hawk-Dove Game Field Experiments," CLTS Working Papers 3/14, Centre for Land Tenure Studies, Norwegian University of Life Sciences.
  12. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00796708 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Schram, Arthur & Brandts, Jordi & Gërxhani, Klarita, 2010. "Information, bilateral negotiations, and worker recruitment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(8), pages 1035-1058, November.
  14. repec:hal:ciredw:hal-00395939 is not listed on IDEAS

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