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Fairness and Reciprocity in the Hawk-Dove game

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Author Info

  • Neugebauer, Tibor

    ()
    (University of Hannover)

  • Poulsen, Anders

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Aarhus School of Business)

  • Schramm, Arthur

    ()
    (University of Amsterdam)

Abstract

We study fairness and reciprocity in a Hawk-Dove game. This allows us to test various models in one framework. We observe a large extent of selfish and rational behavior. Our results are inconsistent with leading models in this field.

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File URL: http://www.hha.dk/nat/WPER/02-12_aup.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 02-12.

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Length: 7 pages
Date of creation: 01 Jul 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:aareco:2002_012

Note: The paper has been published as Tibor Neugebauer, Anders Poulsen and Arthur Schram. Fairness and reciprocity in the Hawk-Dove Game, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 66, 243-250, 2008
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Postal: The Aarhus School of Business, Prismet, Silkeborgvej 2, DK 8000 Aarhus C, Denmark
Phone: +45 89 486396
Fax: +45 8615 5175
Web page: http://www.asb.dk/departments/nat.aspx
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Keywords: Hawk-Dove game; reciprocity; fairness;

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References

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  1. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2002. "Understanding Social Preferences With Simple Tests," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(3), pages 817-869, August.
  2. Harrison, Glenn W & Hirshleifer, Jack, 1989. "An Experimental Evaluation of Weakest Link/Best Shot Models of Public Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 201-25, February.
  3. Armin Falk & Urs Fischbacher, . "A Theory of Reciprocity," IEW - Working Papers 006, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  4. Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2001. "Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity," Discussion Papers in Economics 14, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  5. Gary Charness and Matthew Rabin., 2000. "Social Preferences: Some Simple Tests and a New Model," Economics Working Papers E00-283, University of California at Berkeley.
  6. Georg Kirchsteiger & Martin Dufwenberg, 2004. "A theory of sequential reciprocity," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/5899, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  7. Ernst Fehr & Simon G�chter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 159-181, Summer.
  8. Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness, 2000. "Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 227-238, March.
  9. Axel Ockenfels & Gary E. Bolton, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March.
  10. Charness, Gary B & Brandts, Jordi, 1998. "Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt4kx7d5pv, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Nathalie Etchart-Vincent, 2013. "Wording and gender effects in a Game of Chicken. An explorative experimental study," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00796708, HAL.
  2. Siegfried Berninghaus & Stephan Schosser & Bodo Vogt, 2013. "Equilibrium Selection under Limited Control - An Experimental Study of the Network Hawk-Dove Game," Jena Economic Research Papers 2013-048, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
  3. Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Ott, Marion, 2012. "Forward-looking behavior in Hawk–Dove games in endogenous networks: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 35-52.
  4. Schram, Arthur & Brandts, Jordi & Gërxhani, Klarita, 2010. "Information, bilateral negotiations, and worker recruitment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(8), pages 1035-1058, November.
  5. Jordi Brandts & Arthur Schram & Klarita Gërxhani, 2007. "Information Networks and Worker Recruitment," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 707.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  6. Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Nathalie Etchart-Vincent, 2013. "Wording and gender effects in a Game of Chicken. An explorative experimental study," Working Papers hal-00796708, HAL.
  7. Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Nathalie Etchart-Vincent, 2008. "Cooperation in a Game of Chicken with Heterogeneous Agents: An Experimental Study," Working Papers hal-00395939, HAL.
  8. Verena Utikal & Urs Fischbacher, 2009. "On the attribution of externalities," TWI Research Paper Series 46, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
  9. Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Nathalie Etchart-Vincent, 2008. "Cooperation in a Game of Chicken with Heterogeneous Agents: An Experimental Study," CIRED Working Papers hal-00395939, HAL.
  10. Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Nathalie Etchart-Vincent, 2012. "The puzzle of cooperation in a game of chicken: An experimental study," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00636089, HAL.
  11. Oprea, Ryan & Henwood, Keith & Friedman, Daniel, 2011. "Separating the Hawks from the Doves: Evidence from continuous time laboratory games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2206-2225.
  12. Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Nathalie Etchart-Vincent, 2011. "Cooperation: the power of a single word? Some experimental evidence on wording and gender effects in a Game of Chicken," Working Papers hal-00741973, HAL.
  13. Holden, Stein & Bezu, Sosina, 2014. "Are Wives less Selfish than their Husbands? Evidence from Hawk-Dove Game Field Experiments," CLTS Working Papers 3/14, Centre for Land Tenure Studies, Norwegian University of Life Sciences.
  14. Benedikt Herrmann & Henrik Orzen, 2008. "The appearance of homo rivalis: Social preferences and the nature of rent seeking," Discussion Papers 2008-10, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.

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