Efficient and Stable Collective Choices under Gregarious Preferences
AbstractWe consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. Agents have gregarious preferences over allocations: given an allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that the final allocation be efficient and stable (no agent can be forced to be a user and no agent who wants to be a user can be excluded). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 714.07.
Date of creation: 15 Oct 2007
Date of revision:
Public Goods; Gregarious Preferences; Subgame Perfect Implementation;
Other versions of this item:
- Massó, Jordi & Nicolò, Antonio, 2008. "Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 591-611, November.
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-10-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-DCM-2007-10-20 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-GTH-2007-10-20 (Game Theory)
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