We discuss sincere voting when voters have cardinal preferences over alternatives. We interpret sincerity as opposed to strategic voting, and thus define sincerity as the optimal behavior when conditions to vote strategically diminish. When voting mechanisms allow for only one message type (simple voting mechanisms) we show that eliminating some conditions for strategic voting, individuals' optimal behavior coincides with an intuitive and common definition of sincerity. In order to obtain a precise definition of sincerity in voting mechanisms allowing for multiple message types (complex voting mechanisms) further restrictions on strategic voting are required. We illustrate our methodological approach using approval voting (AV) as a prime example of complex voting mechanisms for which no conclusive definition of sincerity exists in the literature.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number
722.08.