Sequencing Lifeline Repairs After an Earthquake: An Economic Approach
AbstractRecoveries after recent earthquakes in the U.S. and Japan have shown that large welfare gains can be achieved by reshaping current emergency plans as incentive-compatible contracts. We apply tools from the mechanisms design literature to show ways to integrate economic incentives into the management of natural disasters and discuss issues related to the application to seismic event recovery. The focus is on restoring lifeline services such as the water, gas, transportation, and electric power networks. We put forward decisional procedures that an uninformed planner could employ to set repair priorities and help to coordinate lifeline firms in the post-earthquake reconstruction.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 587.03.
Date of creation: 25 Jun 2004
Date of revision:
utilities; inter-temporal decisions; natural disasters; mechanism design; network externalities;
Other versions of this item:
- Marco Casari & Simon Wilkie, 2005. "Sequencing Lifeline Repairs After an Earthquake: An Economic Approach," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 47-65, September.
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- L97 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Utilities: General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-10-20 (All new papers)
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