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Implementation in Minimax Regret Equilibrium

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  • Ludovic Renou

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  • Karl H. Schlag

Abstract

This note studies the problem of implementing social choice correspondences in environments where individuals have doubts about the rationality of their opponents. We postulate the concept of "-minimax regret as our solution concept and show that social choice correspondences that are Maskin monotonic and satisfy the no-veto power condition are implementable in "-minimax regret equilibrium for all " ? [0, 1).

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File URL: http://www.le.ac.uk/economics/research/repec/lec/leecon/dp09-24.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Leicester in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 09/24.

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Date of creation: Oct 2009
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Handle: RePEc:lec:leecon:09/24

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Postal: Department of Economics University of Leicester, University Road. Leicester. LE1 7RH. UK
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Keywords: Implementation; minimax regret; Maskin monotonicity.;

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References

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  1. Maskin, Eric, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38, January.
  2. Jackson, Matthew O., 1999. "A Crash Course in Implementation Theory," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 1076, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  3. Norovsambuu Tumennasan, 2011. "To Err is Human: Implementation in Quantal Response Equilibria," Economics Working Papers, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus 2011-11, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
  4. Matthew O. Jackson, 1990. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 966, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen & Tercieux, Olivier, 2011. "Rationalizable implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 146(3), pages 1253-1274, May.
  6. Claudio Mezzetti & Ludovic Renou, 2009. "Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 902, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  7. Antonio Cabrales & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Implementation in Adaptive Better-Response Dynamics," Economics Working Papers we075731, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  8. Ludovic Renou & Karl H. Schlag, 2008. "Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty," Discussion Papers in Economics, Department of Economics, University of Leicester 08/2, Department of Economics, University of Leicester, revised Apr 2008.
  9. Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Working Papers, Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics 5-01-1, Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics.
  10. Sjostrom Tomas, 1994. "Implementation in Undominated Nash Equilibria without Integer Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 502-511, May.
  11. Hayashi, Takashi, 2008. "Regret aversion and opportunity dependence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 242-268, March.
  12. Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1991. "Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 479-501, March.
  13. Jörg Stoye, 2011. "Statistical decisions under ambiguity," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 70(2), pages 129-148, February.
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Cited by:
  1. repec:dpr:wpaper:0874 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Masuda, Takehito & Okano, Yoshitaka & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 2014. "The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 73-85.
  3. Felix Bierbrauer & Nick Netzer, 2012. "Mechanism Design and Intentions," Working Paper Series in Economics, University of Cologne, Department of Economics 53, University of Cologne, Department of Economics, revised 21 Aug 2012.
  4. Stoye, Jörg, 2011. "Axioms for minimax regret choice correspondences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2226-2251.
  5. Takehito Masuda & Yoshitaka Okano & Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2013. "The Minimum Approval Mechanism Implements the Efficient Public Good Allocation Theoretically and Experimentally," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 0874r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Sep 2013.

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