This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

The political economy of FEMA disaster payments

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Thomas A. Garrett
Russell S. Sobel

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We find that presidential and congressional influences affect the rate of disaster declaration and the allocation of FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) disaster expenditures across states. States politically important to the president have a higher rate of disaster declaration by the president, and disaster expenditures are higher in states having congressional representation on FEMA oversight committees. Election year impacts are also found. Our models predict that nearly half of all disaster relief is motivated politically rather than by need. The findings reject a purely altruistic model of FEMA assistance and question the relative effectiveness of government versus private disaster relief.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2002/2002-012.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis in its series Working Papers with number 2002-012.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedlwp:2002-012

Contact details of provider:
Postal: P.O. Box 442, St. Louis, MO 63166
Fax: (314)444-8753
Web page: http://www.stlouisfed.org/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Diane Rosenberger).

Related research
Keywords: Disaster relief;

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Marilyn Young & Michael Reksulak & William F. Shughart, 2001. "The Political Economy of the IRS," Economics and Politics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 13(2), pages 201-220, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Richard Cebula & Michael Toma, 2006. "Preliminary Evidence on the Allocation of U.S. Army Deaths from Operation Iraqi Freedom," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 34(1), pages 3-14, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. yamamura, eiji, 2008. "Learning Effect And Social Capital: A Case Study Of Natural Disaster From Japan," MPRA Paper 10249, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  3. Valentino Larcinese & James M. Snyder, Jr. & Cecilia Testa, 2006. "Testing Models Of Distributive Politicsusing Exit Polls To Measure Voterpreferences And Partisanship," STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series 19, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  4. Paul Raschky & Hannelore Weck-Hannemann, 2007. "Charity hazard - A real hazard to natural disaster insurance," Working Papers 2007-04, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck. [Downloadable!]
  5. Marco Casari & Simon Wilkie, 2005. "Sequencing Lifeline Repairs After an Earthquake: An Economic Approach," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 47-65, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Alejandro Esteller-More, 2003. "The Politics of Tax Administration: Evidence from Spain," Public Economics 0303004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  7. Paul Raschky, 2007. "Estimating the effects of risk transfer mechanisms against floods in Europe and U.S.A.: A dynamic panel approach," Working Papers 2007-05, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck. [Downloadable!]
  8. Paul Raschky, 2007. "The overprotective parent - Bureaucratic agencies and natural hazard management," Working Papers 2007-03, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? The most prolific authors have over 700 items listed on IDEAS.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-27.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.