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Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium

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  • Renou, Ludovic
  • Schlag, Karl H.

Abstract

This Note studies the problem of implementing social choice correspondences in environments where individuals have doubts about the rationality of their opponents. We postulate the concept of [epsilon]-minimax regret as our solution concept and show that social choice correspondences that are Maskin monotonic and satisfy the no-veto power condition are implementable in [epsilon]-minimax regret equilibrium for all [epsilon][set membership, variant][0,1).

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 71 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 527-533

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:71:y:2011:i:2:p:527-533

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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Keywords: Implementation Minimax regret Maskin monotonicity;

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References

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  1. Jackson, Matthew O., 1999. "A Crash Course in Implementation Theory," Working Papers 1076, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  2. Ludovic Renou & Karl H. Schlag, 2008. "Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty," Discussion Papers in Economics 08/2, Department of Economics, University of Leicester, revised Apr 2008.
  3. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2009. "Rationalizable Implementation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1697, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  4. Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Working Papers 5-01-1, Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics.
  5. Claudio Mezzetti & Ludovic Renou, 2012. "Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1146, The University of Melbourne.
  6. Norovsambuu Tumennasan, 2011. "To Err is Human: Implementation in Quantal Response Equilibria," Economics Working Papers 2011-11, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
  7. Matthew O. Jackson, 1990. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 966, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  9. Roberto Serrano & Antonio Cabrales, 2007. "Implementation in Adaptive Better-Response Dynamics," Working Papers 2007-10, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  10. Jörg Stoye, 2011. "Statistical decisions under ambiguity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 70(2), pages 129-148, February.
  11. Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1991. "Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 479-501, March.
  12. Sjostrom, T., 1991. "Implementation in Undominated Nash Equilibria without Integer Games," Papers 491, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  13. Hayashi, Takashi, 2008. "Regret aversion and opportunity dependence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 242-268, March.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Takehito Masuda & Yoshitaka Okano & Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2013. "The Minimum Approval Mechanism Implements the Efficient Public Good Allocation Theoretically and Experimentally," ISER Discussion Paper 0874r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Sep 2013.
  2. repec:dpr:wpaper:0874 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Stoye, Jörg, 2011. "Axioms for minimax regret choice correspondences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2226-2251.
  4. Felix Bierbrauer & Nick Netzer, 2012. "Mechanism design and intentions," ECON - Working Papers 066, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Apr 2014.
  5. Masuda, Takehito & Okano, Yoshitaka & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 2014. "The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 73-85.

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