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The Political Economy of FEMA Disaster Payments

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Author Info
Thomas A. Garrett
Russell S. Sobel

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Abstract

We find that presidential and congressional influences affect the rate of disaster declaration and the allocation of FEMA disaster expenditures across states. States politically important to the president have a higher rate of disaster declaration by the president, and disaster expenditures are higher in states having congressional representation on FEMA oversight committees. Election year impacts are also found. Our models predict that nearly half of all disaster relief is motivated politically rather than by need. The findings reject a purely altruistic model of FEMA assistance and question the relative effectiveness of government versus private disaster relief. (JEL D7, H5) Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ei/cbg023
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Economic Inquiry.

Volume (Year): 41 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 496-509
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Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:41:y:2003:i:3:p:496-509

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Marilyn Young & Michael Reksulak & William F. Shughart, 2001. "The Political Economy of the IRS," Economics and Politics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 13(2), pages 201-220, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Richard Cebula & Michael Toma, 2006. "Preliminary Evidence on the Allocation of U.S. Army Deaths from Operation Iraqi Freedom," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 34(1), pages 3-14, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Paul Raschky & Hannelore Weck-Hannemann, 2007. "Charity hazard - A real hazard to natural disaster insurance," Working Papers 2007-04, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck. [Downloadable!]
  3. Marco Casari & Simon Wilkie, 2005. "Sequencing Lifeline Repairs After an Earthquake: An Economic Approach," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 47-65, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Alejandro Esteller-More, 2003. "The Politics of Tax Administration: Evidence from Spain," Public Economics 0303004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  5. Paul Raschky, 2007. "Estimating the effects of risk transfer mechanisms against floods in Europe and U.S.A.: A dynamic panel approach," Working Papers 2007-05, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck. [Downloadable!]
  6. yamamura, eiji, 2008. "Learning Effect And Social Capital: A Case Study Of Natural Disaster From Japan," MPRA Paper 10249, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  7. Valentino Larcinese & James M. Snyder, Jr. & Cecilia Testa, 2006. "Testing Models Of Distributive Politicsusing Exit Polls To Measure Voterpreferences And Partisanship," STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series 19, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  8. Paul Raschky, 2007. "The overprotective parent - Bureaucratic agencies and natural hazard management," Working Papers 2007-03, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck. [Downloadable!]
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