Consumers' Behavior and the Bertrand Paradox: An ACE approach
AbstractWe analyze the classical Bertrand model when consumers exhibit some strategic behavior in deciding from which seller they will buy. We use two related but different tools. Both consider a probabilistic learning (or evolutionary) mechanism, and in the two of them consumers' behavior in uences the competition between the sellers. The results obtained show that, in general, developing some sort of loyalty is a good strategy for the buyers as it works in their best interest. First, we consider a learning procedure described by a deterministic dynamic system and, using strong simplifying assumptions, we can produce a description of the process behavior. Second, we use nite automata to represent the strategies played by the agents and an adaptive process based on genetic algorithms to simulate the stochastic process of learning. By doing so we can relax some of the strong assumptions used in the rst approach and still obtain the same basic results. It is suggested that the limitations of the rst approach (analytical) provide a good motivation for the second approach (Agent-Based). Indeed, although both approaches address the same problem, the use of Agent-Based computational techniques allows us to relax hypothesis and overcome the limitations of the analytical approach.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 654.05.
Date of creation: 25 Oct 2005
Date of revision:
Agent-Based Computational Economics; Evolutionary Game Theory; Imperfect Competition;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-10-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-CMP-2005-11-17 (Computational Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2005-11-08 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-IND-2005-11-11 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2005-11-01 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Harrington, Joseph Jr. & Chang, Myong-Hun, 2005.
"Co-evolution of firms and consumers and the implications for market dominance,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 245-276, January.
- Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & Myong-Hun Chang, 2002. "Co-Evolution of Firms and Consumers and the Implications for Market Dominance," Computing in Economics and Finance 2002 234, Society for Computational Economics.
- Hehenkamp, Burkhard, 2002. "Sluggish Consumers: An Evolutionary Solution to the Bertrand Paradox," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 44-76, July.
- Miller, John H., 1996. "The coevolution of automata in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 87-112, January.
- Nowak, Martin & Sasaki, Akira & Taylor, Christine & Fudenberg, Drew, 2004. "Emergence of Cooperation and Evolutionary Stability in Finite Populations," Scholarly Articles 3196331, Harvard University Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Xavier Vila).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.