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Risk Taking in Winner-Take-All Competition Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Matthias Kräkel () (University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-42, D-53113 Bonn, Germany, tel: +49 228 733914, fax: +49 228 739210, e-mail: m.kraekel@uni-bonn.de)
Petra Nieken () (University of Cologne, Herbert-Lewin-Str. 2, D-50931 Köln, Germany, tel: +49 221 4706310, fax: +49 221 4705078, e-mail: petra.nieken@uni-koeln.de)
Judith Przemeck () (University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-42, D-53113 Bonn, Germany, tel: +49 228 739213, fax: +49 228 739210, e-mail: judith.przemeck@uni-bonn.de)
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We analyze a two-stage game between two heterogeneous players. At stage one, common risk is chosen by one of the players. At stage two, both players observe the given level of risk and simultaneously invest in a winner-take-all competition. The game is solved theoretically and then tested by using laboratory experiments. We find three effects that determine risk taking at stage one - an effort effect, a likelihood effect and a reversed likelihood effect. For the likelihood effect, risk taking and investments are clearly in line with theory. Pairwise comparison shows that the effort effect seems to be more relevant than the reversed likelihood effect when taking risk.
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Paper provided by SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Papers with number
233.
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Date of creation: Mar 2008Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:233Contact details of provider: Postal: D-68131 Mannheim Fax: +49 621 181-2785 Email: Web page: http://www.sfbtr15.de/ More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: Tournaments ; Competition ; Risk-Taking ; Experiment ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
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