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Risk Taking in Winner-Take-All Competition

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  • Kräkel, Matthias
  • Nieken, Petra
  • Przemeck, Judith

Abstract

We analyze a two-stage game between two heterogeneous players. At stage one, common risk is chosen by one of the players. At stage two, both players observe the given level of risk and simultaneously invest in a winner-take-all competition. The game is solved theoretically and then tested by using laboratory experiments. We find three effects that determine risk taking at stage one - an effort effect, a likelihood effect and a reversed likelihood effect. For the likelihood effect, risk taking and investments are clearly in line with theory. Pairwise comparison shows that the effort effect seems to be more relevant than the reversed likelihood effect when taking risk.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems with number 233.

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Date of creation: Mar 2008
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Handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:233

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Keywords: Tournaments; Competition; Risk-Taking; Experiment;

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Cited by:
  1. Gary Charness & Peter J. Kuhn, 2010. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," NBER Working Papers 15913, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Ottone, Stefania & Ponzano, Ferruccio, 2010. "Competition and cooperation in markets. The experimental case of a winner-take-all setting," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 163-170, April.

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