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Risk-Taking Tournaments: Theory and Experimental Evidence Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Nieken, Petra () (University of Cologne)
Sliwka, Dirk () (University of Cologne)
We study risk-taking behavior in a simple two person tournament in a theoretical model as well as a laboratory experiment. First, a model is analyzed in which two agents simultaneously decide between a risky and a safe strategy and we allow for all possible degrees of correlation between the outcomes of the risky strategies. We show that risk-taking behavior crucially depends on this correlation as well as on the size of a potential lead of one of the contestants. We find that the experimental subjects acted mostly quite well in line with the derived theoretical predictions.
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Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number
3400.
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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2008Date of revision:
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Keywords: tournaments competition risk-taking experiment Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
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Brown, Keith C & Harlow, W V & Starks, Laura T, 1996.
" Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry ,"
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IZA Discussion Papers
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