We study selection contests in which the strategic variable is degree of risk rather than amount of effort. The selection efficiency of such contests is examined. We show that the selection efficiency of a contest may be improved by limiting the competition in two ways; a) by having a small number of contestants, and b) by restricting contestant quality. The results may contribute to the understanding of phenomena like promotion processes in large firms, selection of fund managers and research tournaments.
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Paper provided by Tel Aviv in its series Papers with number
5-99.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C44 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Statistical Decision Theory; Operations Research D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information D29 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Other J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
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Johannes Münster, 2006.
"Selection Tournaments, Sabotage, and Participation,"
Discussion Papers
118, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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Oliver Gürtler, 2005.
"Are 18 holes enough for Tiger Woods?,"
Discussion Papers
44, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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Matthias Kräkel & Petra Nieken & Judith Przemeck, 2008.
"Risk Taking in Winner-Take-All Competition,"
Discussion Papers
233, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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Tor Eriksson & Sabrina Teyssier & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2006.
"Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments,"
Working Papers
0603, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
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