Risk taking in selection contests
We study selection contests in which the strategic variable is degree of risk rather than amount of effort. The selection efficiency of such contests is examined. We show that the selection efficiency of a contest may be improved by limiting the competition in two ways; a) by having a small number of contestants, and b) by restricting contestant quality. The results may contribute to the understanding of phenomena like promotion processes in large firms, selection of fund managers and research tournaments.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981.
"Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
- Margaret A. Meyer, 1991. "Learning from Coarse Information: Biased Contests and Career Profiles," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(1), pages 15-41.
- Hans K. Hvide, 2000.
"Tournament Rewards and Risk Taking,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
0163, Econometric Society.
- Warneryd, Karl, 2002.
"Rent, risk, and replication: Preference adaptation in winner-take-all markets,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 344-364, November.
- Wärneryd, Karl, 2001.
"Rent, risk, and replication: preference adaptation in winner-take-all markets
[Rente, Risiko und Replikation – Präferenz- Anpassung in „Der-Sieger-bekommt-alles“ Märkten]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance FS IV 01-10, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Wärneryd, Karl, 2001. "Rent, risk, and replication: preference adaptation in winner-take-all markets
- Judith A. Chevalier & Glenn D. Ellison, 1995.
"Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives,"
NBER Working Papers
5234, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Chevalier, Judith & Ellison, Glenn, 1997. "Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(6), pages 1167-1200, December.
- Chevalier, J. & Ellison, G., 1996. "Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives," Working papers 96-3, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Sherwin Rosen, 1985.
"Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments,"
NBER Working Papers
1668, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dekel, Eddie & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1999.
"On the Evolution of Attitudes towards Risk in Winner-Take-All Games,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 125-143, July.
- Dekel, E. & Scotchmer, S., 1999. "On the Evolution of Attitudes Towards Risk in Winner-Take-All Games," Papers 4-99, Tel Aviv.
- Schlicht, Ekkehart, 1988. "Promotions, Elections, and Other Contests: Comment on Sherwin Rosen," Munich Reprints in Economics 3170, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Guasch, J Luis, 1988. "Heterogeneity, Tournaments, and Hierarchies," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(4), pages 867-881, August.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:42:y:2003:i:1:p:172-179. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.