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Tournament Rewards and Risk Taking

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Author Info
Hans K. Hvide (Norwegian School of Economics and Business)

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Abstract

This article considers a Lazear-Rosen tournament model where agents can influence both the spread of their output distribution (risk taking) and its mean. The unique equilibrium induces excessive risk taking and a low level of effort. By modifying the tournament to give the highest prize to the agent with the "most moderate" output, a low level of risk taking and high level of effort can be sustained as an equilibrium. The first result can be useful to understand the Relative Performance Evaluation Puzzle of executive compensation, and the second result can be useful to understand puzzling workplace norms promoting mediocrity.

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File URL: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?JOLE200406
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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Labor Economics.

Volume (Year): 20 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 877-898
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:20:y:2002:i:4:p:877-898

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Richard L. Fullerton & R. Preston McAfee, 1999. "Auctioning Entry into Tournaments," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 573-605, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Rajesh Aggarwal & Andrew A. Samwick, 1998. "The Other Side of the Tradeoff: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation," NBER Working Papers 6634, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Chevalier, Judith & Ellison, Glenn, 1997. "Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(6), pages 1167-1200, December.
    Other versions:
  4. Dekel, Eddie & Ely, Jeffrey & Yilankaya, Okan, 2004. "Evolution of Preferences," Micro Theory Working Papers dekel-04-08-13-01-21-07, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 09 Jun 2006. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Brown, Keith C & Harlow, W V & Starks, Laura T, 1996. " Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(1), pages 85-110, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Heinkel, Robert & Stoughton, Neal M, 1994. "The Dynamics of Portfolio Management Contracts," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(2), pages 351-87. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Matthias Kräkel & Dirk Sliwka, 2001. "Risk Taking in Asymmetric Tournaments," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse33_2001, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Lee, Jungmin, 2004. "Prize and Risk-Taking Strategy in Tournaments: Evidence from Professional Poker Players," IZA Discussion Papers 1345, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  3. Matthias Kräkel & Petra Nieken & Judith Przemeck, 2008. "Risk Taking in Winner-Take-All Competition," Discussion Papers 233, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Kong-Pin Chen, 2004. "External Recruitment as an incentive Device," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 54, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Wu, Steven & Roe, Brian & Sporleder, Thomas, 2006. "Mixed Tournaments, Common Shocks, and Disincentives: An Experimental Study," MPRA Paper 21, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  6. Christian Grund & Oliver Gürtler, 2005. "An Empirical Study on Risk Taking in Tournaments," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse6_2005, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Matthias Kräkel, 2007. "Optimal Risk Taking in an Uneven Tournament Game with Risk Averse Players," Discussion Papers 200, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 2003. "Inequity Aversion in Tournament," CIRANO Working Papers 2003s-18, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Oliver Gürtler & Christine Harbring, 2007. "Feedback in Tournaments under Commitment Problems: Theory and Experimental Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 3111, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  10. Gyongyi Loranth & Emanuela Sciubba, 2006. "Relative Performance, Risk and Entry in the Mutual Fund Industry," Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 6(1), pages 1540-1540. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Goriaev, A. & Palomino, F. & Prat, A., 2000. "Mutual fund tournament : risk taking incentives induced by ranking objectives," Discussion Paper 94, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Nieken, Petra & Sliwka, Dirk, 2008. "Risk-Taking Tournaments: Theory and Experimental Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 3400, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  13. Oliver Gürtler & Matthias Kräkel, 2008. "Optimal Tournament Contracts for Heterogenous Workers," Discussion Papers 234, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
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