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Affirmative action in contest games

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  • Franke, Jörg

Abstract

This paper analyzes the incentive effects of affirmative action in competitive environments. Competition is between heterogeneous players in a contest game where heterogeneity might be due to past discrimination. Two policy options are analyzed that tackle the underlying asymmetry: either it is ignored and the contestants are treated equally, or affirmative action is implemented to neutralize the disadvantages of discriminated players. Comparing the induced effort exertion under the two policies reveals that in a two-player contest game the normative neutralization objective of affirmative action coincides with higher effort exertion. However, in the multi-player contest affirmative action might have adverse incentive effects as the participation of additional weak players detrimentally affects effort incentives of other players. These results also obtain under imperfect information of the contest organizer.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 28 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 105-118

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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:28:y:2012:i:1:p:105-118

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

Related research

Keywords: Asymmetric contest; Affirmative action; Discrimination;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Alasdair Brown & Subhasish M. Chowdhury, 2014. "The Hidden Perils of Affirmative Action: Sabotage in Handicap Contests," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. 062, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  2. Dahm, Matthias & Esteve, Patrícia,, 2013. "Affirmative Action through Extra Prizes," Working Papers 2072/222197, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  3. Franke, Jörg & Kanzow, Christian & Leininger, Wolfgang & Schwartz, Alexandra, 2014. "Lottery versus all-pay auction contests: A revenue dominance theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 116-126.
  4. Yosef Mealem & Shmuel Nitzan, 2013. "Direct and Structural Discrimination in Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 4518, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Gil S. Epstein & Yosef Mealem & Shmuel Nitzan, 2013. "Lotteries vs. All-Pay Auctions in Fair and Biased Contests," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(1), pages 48-60, 03.
  6. Yosef Mealem & Shmuel Nitzan, 2014. "Equity and effectiveness of optimal taxation in contests under an all-pay auction," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 437-464, February.
  7. Yosef Mealem & Shmuel Nitzan, 2012. "Differential Prize Taxation and Structural Discrimination in Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 3831, CESifo Group Munich.
  8. Gil S. Epstein & Yosef Mealem, 2013. "Politicians, Governed vs. Non-Governed Interest Groups and Rent Dissipation," Working Papers 2013-09, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
  9. Olivier Bos & Béatrice Roussillon & Paul Schweinzer, 2013. "Agreeing on Efficient Emissions Reduction," CESifo Working Paper Series 4345, CESifo Group Munich.

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