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The effects of party campaign spending under proportional representation: Evidence from Germany

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  • Fink, Alexander
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    Abstract

    Most of the literature investigating the effects of campaign spending on electoral outcomes focuses on individual candidates in majoritarian systems. This paper contributes to the literature on the effectiveness of party campaign spending on party vote shares under systems of proportional representation. German data are used to test several hypotheses derived from a simple election contest model. The results are mixed and only partially support the hypothesis of a positive effect of campaign spending on a party's vote share.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

    Volume (Year): 28 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 4 ()
    Pages: 574-592

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:28:y:2012:i:4:p:574-592

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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    Keywords: Proportional representation; Campaign spending; Election contest model; Germany;

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