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Social Networks and Peer Effects at Work

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  • Julie Beugnot

    (CIRPEE - Centre interuniversitaire sur le risque, les politiques économiques et l'emploi - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques Economiques et l'Emploi)

  • Bernard Fortin

    (CIRPEE - Centre interuniversitaire sur le risque, les politiques économiques et l'emploi - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques Economiques et l'Emploi, CIRANO - Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations - Université du Québec à Montréal)

  • Guy Lacroix

    (CIRPEE - Centre interuniversitaire sur le risque, les politiques économiques et l'emploi - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques Economiques et l'Emploi, CIRANO - Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations - Université du Québec à Montréal)

  • Marie Claire Villeval

    ()
    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS : UMR5824 - Université Lumière - Lyon II - École Normale Supérieure (ENS) - Lyon - PRES Université de Lyon - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - Université Claude Bernard - Lyon I)

Abstract

This paper extends the standard work effort model by allowing workers to interact through networks. We investigate experimentally whether peer performances and peer contextual effects influence individual performances. Two types of network are considered. Participants in Recursive networks are paired with participants who played previously in isolation. In Simultaneous networks, participants interact in real-time along an undirected line. Mean peer effects are identified in both cases. Individual performances increase with peer performances in the recursive network. In the simultaneous network, endogenous peer effects vary according to gender : they are large for men but not statistically different from zero for women.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number halshs-00855047.

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Date of creation: 28 Aug 2013
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00855047

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Keywords: Peer effects; social networks; work effort; piece rate; experiment;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Georganas, Sotiris & Tonin, Mirco & Vlassopoulos, Michael, 2013. "Peer Pressure and Productivity: The Role of Observing and Being Observed," IZA Discussion Papers 7523, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  2. Cicognani, Simona & Mittone, Luigi, 2014. "Social norms or low-cost heuristics? An experimental investigation of imitative behavior," Economics Discussion Papers 2014-2, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  3. van Veldhuizen, Roel & Oosterbeek, Hessel & Sonnemans, Joep, 2014. "Peers at work: From the field to the lab," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2014-204, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).

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