We study the effect of providing relative performance feedback information on performance underpiece-rate incentives. A natural experiment that took place in a high school offers an unusualopportunity to test this effect in a real-effort setting. For one year only, students received informationthat allowed them to know whether they were above (below) the class average as well as the distancefrom this average. We exploit a rich panel data set and find that the provision of this information ledto an increase of 5% in students' grades. Moreover, the effect was significant for the wholedistribution. However, once the information was removed the effect disappeared. To rule out theconcern that the effect may be driven by teachers within the school, we verify our results usingnational level exams (externally graded) for the same students, and the effect remains.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Centre for Economic Performance, LSE in its series CEP Discussion Papers with number
dp0915.
Find related papers by JEL classification: I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects C30 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Tor Eriksson & Anders Poulsen & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2008.
"Feedback and Incentives : Experimental Evidence,"
Working Papers
0812, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
[Downloadable!]
Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela & Xianwen Shi, 2007.
"Contests for Status,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 115, pages 338-363.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela & Xianwen Shi, 2005.
"Contests for Status,"
Discussion Papers
139, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
[Downloadable!]