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The Incentive Effects of Interim Performance Evaluations

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  • Alessandro Lizzeri
  • Margaret A. Meyer
  • Nicola Persico

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Penn Economics Department in its series Penn CARESS Working Papers with number 592e9328faf6e775bf331e1c08707dd2.

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Date of creation: Sep 2002
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Handle: RePEc:cla:penntw:592e9328faf6e775bf331e1c08707dd2

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Cited by:
  1. Tor Eriksson & Anders Poulsen & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2008. "Feedback and Incentives : Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 0812, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
  2. Hanming Fang & Giuseppe Moscarini, 2004. "Morale Hazard," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm386, Yale School of Management.
  3. Anton Suvorov & Jeroen van de Ven, 2006. "Discretionary Bonuses as a Feedback Mechanism," Working Papers w0088, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
  4. Azmat, Ghazala & Iriberri, Nagore, 2010. "The importance of relative performance feedback information: Evidence from a natural experiment using high school students," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(7-8), pages 435-452, August.
  5. Aoyagi, Masaki, 2010. "Information feedback in a dynamic tournament," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 242-260, November.
  6. Bin R. Chen & Y. Stephen Chiu, 2013. "Interim Performance Evaluation in Contract Design," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123, pages 665-698, 06.
  7. Nafziger, Julia, 2009. "Timing of information in agency problems with hidden actions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(11), pages 751-766, December.
  8. Terstiege, Stefan, 2013. "Objective versus Subjective Performance Evaluations," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 430, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  9. Yurday, Zeynep, 2003. "The Effects of Interim Performance Evaluations under Risk Aversion," MPRA Paper 1611, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Ghazala Azmat & Nagore Iriberri, 2009. "The importance of relative performance feedback information: evidence from a natural experiment using high school students," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 28520, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

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