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Peers at Work

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Author Info
Alexandre Mas () (University of California, Berkeley and NBER)
Enrico Moretti () (University of California, Berkeley, NBER and IZA Bonn)

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Abstract

We investigate how and why the productivity of a worker varies as a function of the productivity of her co-workers in a group production process. In theory, the introduction of a high productivity worker could lower the effort of incumbent workers because of free riding; or it could increase the effort of incumbent workers because of peer effects induced by social norms, social pressure, or learning. Using scanner level data, we measure high frequency, worker-level productivity of checkers for a large grocery chain. Because of the firm‘s scheduling policy, the timing of within-day changes in personnel is unsystematic, a feature for which we find consistent support in the data. We find strong evidence of positive productivity spillovers from the introduction of highly productive personnel into a shift. A 10% increase in average co-worker permanent productivity is associated with 1.7% increase in a worker’s effort. Most of this peer effect arises from low productivity workers benefiting from the presence of high productivity workers. Therefore, the optimal mix of workers in a given shift is the one that maximizes skill diversity. In order to explain the mechanism that generates the peer effect, we examine whether effort depends on workers’ ability to monitor one another due to their spatial arrangement, and whether effort is affected by the time workers have previously spent working together. We find that a given worker’s effort is positively related to the presence and speed of workers who face him, but not the presence and speed of workers whom he faces (and do not face him). In addition, workers respond more to the presence of co-workers with whom they frequently overlap. These patterns indicate that these individuals are motivated by social pressure and mutual monitoring, and suggest that social preferences can play an important role in inducing effort, even when economic incentives are limited.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 2292.

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Length: 52 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2292

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Related research
Keywords: spillovers;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
J01 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - Labor Economics: General

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  2. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter & Georg Kirchsteiger, 1997. "Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 833-860, July.
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    Other versions:
  4. Oriana Bandiera & Iwan Barankay & Imran Rasul, 2005. "Social Preferences and the Response to Incentives: Evidence from Personnel Data," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 120(3), pages 917-962, August.
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  5. Edward P. Lazear, 2001. "Educational Production," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(3), pages 777-803, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Enrico Moretti, 2004. "Workers' Education, Spillovers, and Productivity: Evidence from Plant-Level Production Functions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 656-690, June. [Downloadable!]
  8. Enrico Moretti, 2002. "Estimating the Social Return to Higher Education: Evidence From Longitudinal and Repeated Cross-Sectional Data," NBER Working Papers 9108, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Philip Oreopoulos, 2003. "The Long-Run Consequences Of Living In A Poor Neighborhood," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(4), pages 1533-1575, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Bruce Sacerdote, 2001. "Peer Effects With Random Assignment: Results For Dartmouth Roommates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(2), pages 681-704, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Marianne Bertrand & Erzo F. P. Luttmer & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2000. "Network Effects And Welfare Cultures," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(3), pages 1019-1055, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. David N. Figlio, 2005. "Boys Named Sue: Disruptive Children and their Peers," NBER Working Papers 11277, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Armin Falk & Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gaechter, 2003. "Living in Two Neighborhoods -- Social Interactions in the LAB," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Manski, Charles F, 1993. "Identification of Endogenous Social Effects: The Reflection Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 60(3), pages 531-42, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Behncke, Stefanie & Frölich, Markus & Lechner, Michael, 2008. "A Caseworker Like Me - Does the Similarity between unemployed and Caseworker Increase Job Placements?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6784, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Yannis M. Ioannides & Giulio Zanella, 2008. "Searching for the Best Neighborhood: Mobility and Social Interactions," Department of Economics University of Siena 533, Department of Economics, University of Siena. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Giovanni Peri, 2008. "Immigration Accounting: U.S. States 1960-2006," CReAM Discussion Paper Series 00805, Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration (CReAM), Department of Economics, University College London. [Downloadable!]
  4. Kato, Takao & Shu, Pian, 2008. "Performance Spillovers and Social Network in the Workplace: Evidence from Rural and Urban Weavers in a Chinese Textile Firm," IZA Discussion Papers 3340, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  5. Simon Board, 2007. "Monopolistic Group Design with Peer Effects," Working Papers tecipa-276, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Timothy J. Halliday & Sally Kwak, 2007. "Bad Apples, Goody Two Shoes and Average Joes: The Role of Peer Group Definitions in Estimation of Peer Effects," Working Papers 200730, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Daniel S. Hamermesh, 2007. "Fun with Matched Firm-Employee Data: Progress and Road Maps," IZA Discussion Papers 2580, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  8. James B. Bushnell & Catherine Wolfram, 2007. "The Guy at the Controls: Labor Quality and Power Plant Efficiency," NBER Working Papers 13215, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Gould, Eric D. & Kaplan, Todd R., 2008. "Learning Unethical Practices from a Co-worker: The Peer Effect of Jose Canseco," IZA Discussion Papers 3328, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  10. Giacomo De Giorgi & Michele Pellizzari & Silvia Redaelli, 2007. "Be as Careful of the Books You Read as of the Company You Keep: Evidence on Peer Effects in Educational Choices," IZA Discussion Papers 2833, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  11. Jirjahn, Uwe & Kraft, Kornelius, 2008. "Teamwork and Intra-Firm Wage Dispersion among Blue-Collar Workers," IZA Discussion Papers 3291, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  12. Stephen L. Ross, 2009. "Social Interactions within Cities: Neighborhood Environments and Peer Relationships," Working papers 2009-31, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. Jonathan Guryan & Kory Kroft & Matt Notowidigdo, 2007. "Peer Effects in the Workplace: Evidence from Random Groupings in Professional Golf Tournaments," NBER Working Papers 13422, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Eric D. Gould & Eyal Winter, 2007. "Interactions Between Workers and the Technology of Production: Evidence from Professional Baseball," IZA Discussion Papers 3096, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  15. Ethan Cohen-Cole & Giulio Zanella, 2007. "Unpacking social interactions," Quantitative Analysis Unit Working Paper QAU07-4, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. [Downloadable!]
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  16. Tor Eriksson & Anders Poulsen & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2008. "Feedback and Incentives : Experimental Evidence," Post-Print halshs-00276396_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
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  17. Sebastian Goerg & Sebastian Kube & Ro'i Zultan, 2007. "Treating Equals Unequally - Incentives in Teams, Workers' Motivation and Production Technology," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse17_2007, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Jan 2008. [Downloadable!]
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  18. Charles Bellemare & Patrick Lepage & Bruce Shearer, 2009. "Peer Pressure, Incentives, and Gender: an Experimental Analysis of Motivation in the Workplace," Cahiers de recherche 0901, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
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