1. Friedland, Nehemiah & Maital, Shlomo & Rutenberg, Aryeh, 1978. "A simulation study of income tax evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 107-116, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Alm, James & Sanchez, Isabel & de Juan, Ana, 1995. "Economic and Noneconomic Factors in Tax Compliance," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(1), pages 3-18.
3. Slemrod, Joel & Blumenthal, Marsha & Christian, Charles, 2001. "Taxpayer response to an increased probability of audit: evidence from a controlled experiment in Minnesota," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 455-483, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. William A. Brock & Steven N. Durlauf, 2000. "Interactions-Based Models," Working Papers 00-05-028, Santa Fe Institute.
   Other versions:
   • William Brock & Steven N. Durlauf, 2000. "Interactions-Based Models," NBER Technical Working Papers 0258, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Brock, William A. & Durlauf, Steven N., 2001. "Interactions-based models," Handbook of Econometrics, in: J.J. Heckman & E.E. Leamer (ed.), Handbook of Econometrics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 54, pages 3297-3380 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1994. "The Role of Moral Sentiments and Audit Perceptions in Tax Compliance," Carleton Industrial Organization Research Unit (CIORU) 94-03, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
6. Torgler, Benno, 2002. " Speaking to Theorists and Searching for Facts: Tax Morale and Tax Compliance in Experiments," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 16(5), pages 657-83, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Elffers, Henk & Weigel, Russell H. & Hessing, Dick J., 1987. "The consequences of different strategies for measuring tax evasion behavior," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 311-337, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Charles F. Manski, 2000. "Economic Analysis of Social Interactions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 115-136, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Charles F. Manski, 2000. "Economic Analysis of Social Interactions," NBER Working Papers 7580, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Falk, Armin & Fischbacher, Urs, 2002. ""Crime" in the lab-detecting social interaction," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 859-869, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Sheffrin, S.M. & Triest, R.K., 1991. "Can Brute Deterrence Backfire? Perceptions and Attitudes in Taxpayer Compliance," Papers 373, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
11. Gordon, James P. P., 1989. "Individual morality and reputation costs as deterrents to tax evasion," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 797-805, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Brock, William A & Durlauf, Steven N, 2001. "Discrete Choice with Social Interactions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 68(2), pages 235-60, April.
13. Bosco, Luigi & Mittone, Luigi, 1997. "Tax Evasion and Moral Constraints: Some Experimental Evidence," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(3), pages 297-324.
    Other versions:
    • Luigi Bosco & Luigi Mittone, 1994. "Tax evasion and moral constraints: some experimental evidence," Department of Economics Working Papers 9402, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
14. Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 1974. "Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 201-202, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Myles, Gareth D. & Naylor, Robin A., 1996. "A model of tax evasion with group conformity and social customs," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 49-66, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. James Andreoni & Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1998. "Tax Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(2), pages 818-860, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. repec:att:wimass:199610 is not listed on IDEAS
18. Edward L. Glaeser & Bruce I. Sacerdote & Jose A. Scheinkman, 2003. "The Social Multiplier," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(2-3), pages 345-353, 04/05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Edward L. Glaeser & Bruce I. Sacerdote & Jose A. Scheinkman, 2002. "The Social Multiplier," NBER Working Papers 9153, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Edward L. Glaeser & Bruce I. Sacerdote & Jose A. Scheinkman, 2002. "The Social Multiplier," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1968, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    • E. Glaeser & B. Sacerdote & Jose A. Scheinkman, 2003. "The Social Multiplier," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000130, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
19. Wenzel, Michael, 2004. "An analysis of norm processes in tax compliance," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 213-228, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
20. Evans, William N & Oates, Wallace E & Schwab, Robert M, 1992. "Measuring Peer Group Effects: A Study of Teenage Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 966-91, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
21. Spicer, Michael W. & Hero, Rodney E., 1985. "Tax evasion and heuristics : A research note," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 263-267, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
22. Akerlof, George A, 1980. "A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May be One Consequence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 94(4), pages 749-75, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • George A. Akerlof, 1978. "A theory of social custom, of which unemployment may be one consequence," Special Studies Papers 118, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
23. Edward L. Glaeser & Jose Scheinkman, 2000. "Non-Market Interactions," NBER Working Papers 8053, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Edward L. Glaeser & Jose A. Scheinkman, 2001. "Non-Market Interactions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1914, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
24. Aronsson, Thomas & Blomquist, Soren & Sacklen, Hans, 1999. "Identifying Interdependent Behaviour in an Empirical Model of Labour Supply," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(6), pages 607-26, Nov.-Dec.. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Aronsson, Thomas & Blomquist, Sören & Sacklén, Hans, 1998. "Identifying Interdependent Behavior in an Empirical Model of Labor Supply," Working Paper Series 147, Trade Union Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
25. Manski, Charles F, 1993. "Identification of Endogenous Social Effects: The Reflection Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 60(3), pages 531-42, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
26. Brian Krauth, 2004. "Simulation-based estimation of peer effects," Econometrics 0408002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Krauth, Brian V., 2006. "Simulation-based estimation of peer effects," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 243-271, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
27. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
28. Clotfelter, Charles T, 1983. "Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 65(3), pages 363-73, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
29. Amemiya, Takeshi, 1974. "Multivariate Regression and Simultaneous Equation Models when the Dependent Variables Are Truncated Normal," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 42(6), pages 999-1012, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
30. Gourieroux, C & Laffont, J J & Monfort, A, 1980. "Coherency Conditions in Simultaneous Linear Equation Models with Endogenous Switching Regimes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(3), pages 675-95, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • C. Gourieroux & Jean-Jacques Laffont & A. Monfort, 1979. "Coherency Conditions In Simultaneous Linear Equation Models With Endogenous Switching Regimes," NBER Working Papers 0343, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Andrew E. Clark & David Masclet & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2006. "Effort and Comparison Income: Experimental and Survey Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 2169, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Andrew E. Clark & David Masclet & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2008. "Effort and Comparison Income: Experimental and Survey Evidence," CEP Discussion Papers dp0886, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
2. Guy Lacroix & Natalia Radtchenko, 2008. "The Changing Intra-Household Resource Allocation in Russia," Cahiers de recherche 0811, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Lacroix, Guy & Radtchenko, Natalia, 2008. "The Changing Intra-Household Resource Allocation in Russia," IZA Discussion Papers 3733, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
3. Claude Montmarquette & Giorgio Coricelli & Mateus Joffily & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2007. "Tax Evasion: Cheating Rationally or Deciding Emotionally?," Working Papers 0724, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Giorgio Coricelli & Matteus Joffily & Claude Montmarquette & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2007. "Tax Evasion: Cheating Rationally or Deciding Emotionally?," Post-Print hal-00196332_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
   • Giorgio Coricelli & Mateus Joffily & Claude Montmarquette & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2007. "Tax Evasion: Cheating Rationally or Deciding Emotionally?," CIRANO Working Papers 2007s-22, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
   • Giorgio Coricelli & Mateus Joffily & Claude Montmarquette & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2007. "Tax Evasion: Cheating Rationally or Deciding Emotionally?," IZA Discussion Papers 3103, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
4. Konrad, Kai A. & Qari, Salmai, 2009. "The Last Refuge of a Scoundrel? Patriotism and Tax Compliance," IZA Discussion Papers 4121, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Konrad, Kai A & Qari, Salmai, 2009. "The last refuge of a scoundrel? Patriotism and tax compliance," CEPR Discussion Papers 7215, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Gerlinde Fellner & Rupert Sausgruber & Christian Traxler, 2009. "Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Legal Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Gerlinde Fellner & Rupert Sausgruber & Christian Traxler, 2009. "Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Legal Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009_31, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
   • Gerlinde Fellner & Rupert Sausgruber & Christian Traxler, 2009. "Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Legal Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information," Working Papers 2009-23, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck. [Downloadable!]
6. Yann Bramoullé & Habiba Djebbari & Bernard Fortin, 2007. "Identification of Peer Effects through Social Networks," Cahiers de recherche 0705, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Yann Bramoullé & Habiba Djebbari & Bernard Fortin, 2007. "Identification of Peer Effects through Social Networks," IZA Discussion Papers 2652, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
7. Roberto Galbiati & Giulio Zanella, 2008. "The Social Multiplier of Tax Evasion: Evidence from Italian Audit Data," Department of Economics University of Siena 539, Department of Economics, University of Siena. [Downloadable!]
8. Andrew E. Clark & David Masclet & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2006. "Effort and comparison income: Survey and experimental evidence," PSE Working Papers 2006-03, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Andrew Clark & Davis Masclet & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2006. "Effort and Comparison Income : Survey and Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 0601, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
   • Andrew Clark & David Masclet & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2006. "Effort and Comparison Income : Survey and Experimental Evidence," Post-Print halshs-00142880_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
9. Guillaume R. Fréchette, 2006. "Session Effects in the Laboratory," CIRANO Working Papers 2006s-21, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
10. Ratbek Dzhumashev & Emin Gahramanov, 2009. "A Stochastic Growth Model with Income Tax Evasion: Implications for Australia," Economics Series 2009_05, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]