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Do Women Prefer a Co-operative Work Environment?

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Author Info

  • Peter Kuhn

    (Department of Economics, University of California - University of California, Santa Barbara)

  • Marie Claire Villeval

    ()
    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS : UMR5824 - Université Lumière - Lyon II - École Normale Supérieure (ENS) - Lyon - PRES Université de Lyon - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - Université Claude Bernard - Lyon I)

Abstract

Are women disproportionately attracted to work environments where cooperation rather than competition is rewarded? This paper reports the results of a real-effort experiment in which participants choose between an individual compensation scheme and a team-based payment scheme. We find that women are more likely than men to select team-based compensation in our baseline treatment, but women and men join teams with equal frequency when we add an efficiency advantage to team production. Using a simple structural discrete choice framework to reconcile these facts, we show that three elements can account for the observed patterns in the team-entry gender gap: (1) a gender gap in confidence in others (i.e. women are less pessimistic about their prospective teammates' relative ability), (2) a greater responsiveness among men to instrumental reasons for joining teams, and (3) a greater "pure" preference for working in a team environment among women.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00633646.

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Date of creation: 2011
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Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00633646

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Keywords: Gender; cooperation; self-selection; confidence; experiment;

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References

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Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Women prefer cooperative work environments
    by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2011-10-24 14:01:00
  2. Men, Women and Teams
    by Christopher Shea in Ideas Market on 2011-11-11 17:52:34
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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Cited by:
  1. Friesen, Lana & Gangadharan, Lata, 2012. "Individual level evidence of dishonesty and the gender effect," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 624-626.
  2. Dutcher, E. Glenn & Saral, Krista Jabs, 2012. "Does Team Telecommuting Affect Productivity? An Experiment," MPRA Paper 41594, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. E. Glenn Dutcher & Krista Jabs Saral, 2012. "The Impact of Beliefs on Effort in Telecommuting Teams," Working Papers, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck 2012-22, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.

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  1. Economic Logic blog

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