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Gender pairing and bargaining ? Beware the same sex!

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  • Matthias Sutter

    ()

  • Ronald Bosman

    ()

  • Martin Kocher

    ()

  • Frans van Winden

    ()

Abstract

We study the influence of gender and gender pairing on economic decision making in an experimental two-person bargaining game where the other party?s gender is known to both actors. We find that (1) gender per se has no significant effect on behavior, whereas (2) gender pairing systematically affects behavior. In particular, we observe much more competition and retaliation and, thus, lower efficiency when the bargaining partners have the same gender than when they have the opposite gender. These findings are consistent with predictions from psychology. Implications of our results for real-world organizations are discussed.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck in its series Working Papers with number 2008-27.

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Length: 33
Date of creation: Dec 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:inn:wpaper:2008-27

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Keywords: gender pairing; bargaining; psychology; experiment;

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  1. Bolton, Gary E. & Katok, Elena, 1995. "An experimental test for gender differences in beneficent behavior," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 48(3-4), pages 287-292, June.
  2. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher & Bernhard von Rosenbladt & Jürgen Schupp & Gert G. Wagner, 2002. "A Nation-Wide Laboratory: Examining Trust and Trustworthiness by Integrating Behavioral Experiments into Representative Surveys," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 319, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  3. Carpenter, Jeffrey & Verhoogen, Eric & Burks, Stephen, 2005. "The effect of stakes in distribution experiments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 86(3), pages 393-398, March.
  4. Lise Vesterlund, 2008. "How Costly is Diversity? Affirmative Action in Light of Gender Differences in Competitiveness," Working Papers, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics 342, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2008.
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  6. Nancy Buchan & Rachel Croson, 1999. "Gender and Culture: International Experimental Evidence from Trust Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 89(2), pages 386-391, May.
  7. James Andreoni & Lise Vesterlund, 2001. "Which Is The Fair Sex? Gender Differences In Altruism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 116(1), pages 293-312, February.
  8. Dufwenberg, Martin & Muren, Astri, 2006. "Gender composition in teams," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 50-54, September.
  9. Holm, Hakan J., 2000. "Gender-Based Focal Points," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 292-314, August.
  10. Ayres, Ian & Siegelman, Peter, 1995. "Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a New Car," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 304-21, June.
  11. Eckel, Catherine C & Grossman, Philip J, 2001. "Chivalry and Solidarity in Ultimatum Games," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(2), pages 171-88, April.
  12. Uri Gneezy & Muriel Niederle & Aldo Rustichini, 2003. "Performance In Competitive Environments: Gender Differences," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 118(3), pages 1049-1074, August.
  13. Ronald Bosman & Frans van Winden, 2002. "Emotional Hazard in a Power-to-take Experiment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(476), pages 147-169, January.
  14. Bowles, Hannah Riley & Babcock, Linda & McGinn, Kathleen L., 2005. "Constraints and Triggers: Situational Mechanics of Gender in Negotiation," Working Paper Series, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government rwp05-051, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
  15. Muriel Niederle & Carmit Segal & Lise Vesterlund, 2013. "How Costly Is Diversity? Affirmative Action in Light of Gender Differences in Competitiveness," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 59(1), pages 1-16, May.
  16. Donna K. Ginther & Shulamit Kahn, 2004. "Women in Economics: Moving Up or Falling Off the Academic Career Ladder?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 18(3), pages 193-214, Summer.
  17. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
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