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Competitive Preferences and Status as an Incentive : Experimental Evidence

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Author Info

  • Gary Charness

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara, 2127 North Hall, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9210)

  • David Masclet

    ()
    (CREM, CNRS, University of Rennes, 7 place Hoche, 35000 Rennes, France, and CIRANO, Montreal, Canada)

  • Marie-Claire Villeval

    ()
    (Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69003, France; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne, UMR 5824, 93, chemin des Mouilles, Ecully, F-69130, France; ENS-LSH, Lyon, France)

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate individuals’ investment in status in an environment where no monetary return can possibly be derived from reaching a better relative position. We use a real-effort experiment in which we permit individuals to learn and potentially improve their status (rank). We find that people express both intrinsic motivation and a taste for status. Indeed, people increase their effort when they are simply informed about their relative performance, and people pay both to sabotage others’ output and to artificially increase their own relative performance. In addition, stronger group identity favors positive rivalry and discourages sabotage among peers.

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File URL: ftp://ftp.gate.cnrs.fr/RePEc/2010/1016.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure in its series Working Papers with number 1016.

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Length: 50 pages
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:gat:wpaper:1016

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Related research

Keywords: Status seeking; rank; competitive preferences; experiment;

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Cited by:
  1. Brice Corgnet & Roberto Hernán-González & Stephen Rassenti, 2011. "Real Effort, Real Leisure and Real-time Supervision: Incentives and Peer Pressure in Virtual Organizations," Working Papers 11-05, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  2. Aldo Rustichini & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2012. "Moral Hypocrisy, Power and Social Preferences," Working Papers 1216, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
  3. Jurjen J.A. Kamphorst & Otto H. Swank, 2010. "When Galatea cares about her Reputation: How having Faith in your Workers reduces their Motivation to shine," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-123/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  4. Tor Eriksson & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2012. "Respect and relational contracts," Post-Print halshs-00642527, HAL.
  5. Loukas Balafoutas & Florian Lindner & Matthias Sutter, 2012. "Sabotage in tournaments: Evidence from a natural experiment," Working Papers 2012-01, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
  6. Nadja Kairies & Miriam Krieger, 2013. "How do Non-Monetary Performance Incentives for Physicians Affect the Quality of Medical Care? – A Laboratory Experiment," Ruhr Economic Papers 0414, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
  7. Peter Kuhn & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2011. "Do Women Prefer a Co-operative Work Environment?," Working Papers 1127, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
  8. Tran, Anh & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2012. "Rank as an inherent incentive: Evidence from a field experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(9-10), pages 645-650.

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