IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/ucp/jlabec/v22y2004i3p615-638.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

Agency Theory and Executive Compensation: The Case of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Bryson, Alex & Forth, John & Zhou, Minghai, 2014. "Who posts performance bonds and why? Evidence from China's CEOs," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 520-529.
  2. Xunan Feng & Anders C. Johansson, 2017. "CEO Incentives in Chinese State-Controlled Firms," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 223-264.
  3. Dong, Xiao-yuan & Xu, Lixin Colin, 2009. "Labor restructuring in China: Toward a functioning labor market," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 287-305, June.
  4. Kato, Takao & Long, Cheryl, 2006. "Executive Compensation, Firm Performance, and Corporate Governance in China: Evidence from Firms Listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(4), pages 945-983, July.
  5. Chi, Wei & Zhang, Haiyan, 2008. "Is Cross-listing Associated with Stronger Executive Incentives? Evidence from China," MPRA Paper 11649, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Kevin Amess & Jun Du & Sourafel Girma, "undated". "Full and Partial Privatization in China: The Labor Consequences," Discussion Papers 09/11, University of Nottingham, GEP.
  7. Conyon, Martin J. & He, Lerong, 2011. "Executive compensation and corporate governance in China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 1158-1175, September.
  8. Firth, Michael & Fung, Peter M.Y. & Rui, Oliver M., 2007. "How ownership and corporate governance influence chief executive pay in China's listed firms," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 60(7), pages 776-785, July.
  9. Kato, Takao & Long, Cheryl, 2006. "CEO Turnover, Firm Performance and Enterprise Reform in China: Evidence from New Micro Data," IZA Discussion Papers 1914, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  10. Zhigang Zheng & Li-An Zhou & Yanmei Sun & Chao Chen, 2016. "Executive Compensation and Legal Investor Protection: Evidence from China's Listed Firms," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(1), pages 39-47, February.
  11. Shujun Ding & Zhenyu Wu & Yuanshun Li & Chunxin Jia, 2010. "Executive compensation, supervisory board, and China’s governance reform: a legal approach perspective," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 445-471, November.
  12. Kato, Takao & Kim, Woochan & Lee, Ju Ho, 2007. "Executive compensation, firm performance, and Chaebols in Korea: Evidence from new panel data," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 36-55, January.
  13. Clement Chow & Michael Fung & Kevin Lam & Heibatollah Sami, 2012. "Investment opportunity set, political connection and business policies of private enterprises in China," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 367-389, April.
  14. Chi, Wei & Wang, Yijiang, 2007. "Ownership, Performance and Executive Turnover," MPRA Paper 3545, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. Martin J. Conyon & Lerong He & Xin Zhou, 2015. "Star CEOs or Political Connections? Evidence from China's Publicly Traded Firms," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(3-4), pages 412-443, April.
  16. Mike W. Peng & Sunny Li Sun & Lívia Markóczy, 2015. "Human Capital and CEO Compensation during Institutional Transitions," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(1), pages 117-147, January.
  17. Rajiv D. Banker & Danlu Bu & Mihir N. Mehta, 2016. "Pay Gap and Performance in China," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 52(3), pages 501-531, September.
  18. Shujun Ding & Chunxin Jia & Craig Wilson & Zhenyu Wu, 2015. "Political connections and agency conflicts: the roles of owner and manager political influence on executive compensation," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 407-434, August.
  19. repec:kap:jbuset:v:150:y:2018:i:4:d:10.1007_s10551-016-3190-y is not listed on IDEAS
  20. Firth, Michael & Leung, Tak Yan & Rui, Oliver M., 2010. "Justifying top management pay in a transitional economy," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 852-866, December.
  21. Dr Alex Bryson & John Forth, 2012. "CEO Bonding: Who Posts Performance Bonds and Why?," National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) Discussion Papers 389, National Institute of Economic and Social Research.
  22. Dai, Yunhao & Kong, Dongmin & Xu, Jin, 2017. "Does fairness breed efficiency? Pay gap and firm productivity in China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 406-422.
  23. Jared Harris, 2009. "What’s Wrong with Executive Compensation?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 85(1), pages 147-156, February.
  24. Shujun Ding & Chunxin Jia & Yuanshun Li & Zhenyu Wu, 2010. "Reactivity and Passivity After Enforcement Actions: Better Late Than Never," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 95(2), pages 337-359, September.
  25. Pattarin Adithipyangkul & Ilan Alon & Tianyu Zhang, 2011. "Executive perks: Compensation and corporate performance in China," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 401-425, June.
  26. Firth, Michael & Fung, Peter M.Y. & Rui, Oliver M., 2006. "Corporate performance and CEO compensation in China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 693-714, September.
  27. DeVaro, Jed, 2011. "Using "opposing responses" and relative performance to distinguish empirically among alternative models of promotions," MPRA Paper 35175, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  28. Chi, Wei & Wang, Yijiang, 2009. "Ownership, performance and executive turnover in China," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 465-478, September.
  29. Yang Yao & Ninghua Zhong, 2013. "Unions and Workers' Welfare in Chinese Firms," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(3), pages 633-667.
  30. David Smith, 2012. "Guanxi, Mianzi, and Business : The Impact of Culture on Corporate Governance in China," World Bank Other Operational Studies 17094, The World Bank.
  31. Chen Lin & Wei Shen & Dongwei Su, 2011. "Executive Pay at Publicly Listed Firms in China," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(2), pages 417-436.
  32. Xunan Feng & Anders C. Johansson, 2018. "Underpaid and Corrupt Executives in China’s State Sector," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 150(4), pages 1199-1212, July.
  33. repec:eee:jiaata:v:21:y:2012:i:2:p:145-155 is not listed on IDEAS
  34. Jed Devaro & Fidan Ana Kurtulus, 2010. "An Empirical Analysis of Risk, Incentives and the Delegation of Worker Authority," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 63(4), pages 641-661, July.
  35. repec:gam:jeners:v:10:y:2017:i:12:p:2153-:d:123206 is not listed on IDEAS
  36. Amon Chizema & Xiaohui Liu & Jiangyong Lu & Lan Gao, 2015. "Politically connected boards and top executive pay in Chinese listed firms," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(6), pages 890-906, June.
  37. Chi, Wei & Zhang, Haiyan, 2010. "Are stronger executive incentives associated with cross-listing? Evidence from China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 150-160, March.
  38. Unite, Angelo A. & Sullivan, Michael J. & Brookman, Jeffrey & Majadillas, Mary Anne & Taningco, Angelo, 2008. "Executive pay and firm performance in the Philippines," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 16(5), pages 606-623, November.
  39. Kato, Takao & Long, Cheryl, 2006. "CEO turnover, firm performance, and enterprise reform in China: Evidence from micro data," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 796-817, December.
IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.