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Executive compensation, supervisory board, and China’s governance reform: a legal approach perspective

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  • Shujun Ding

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  • Zhenyu Wu

    ()

  • Yuanshun Li

    ()

  • Chunxin Jia

    ()

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Shujun Ding & Zhenyu Wu & Yuanshun Li & Chunxin Jia, 2010. "Executive compensation, supervisory board, and China’s governance reform: a legal approach perspective," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 445-471, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:rqfnac:v:35:y:2010:i:4:p:445-471
    DOI: 10.1007/s11156-010-0168-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 2000. "Investor protection and corporate governance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 3-27.
    2. repec:hrv:faseco:30728046 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Firth, Michael & Fung, Peter M.Y. & Rui, Oliver M., 2006. "Corporate performance and CEO compensation in China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 693-714, September.
    4. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-488, June.
    5. Sun, Qian & Tong, Wilson H. S., 2003. "China share issue privatization: the extent of its success," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 183-222, November.
    6. Darius Palia & Robert Porter, 2004. "The Impact of Capital Requirements and Managerial Compensation on Bank Charter Value," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 191-206, November.
    7. Bai, Chong-En & Liu, Qiao & Lu, Joe & Song, Frank M. & Zhang, Junxi, 2004. "Corporate governance and market valuation in China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 599-616, December.
    8. Elston, Julie Ann & Goldberg, Lawrence G., 2003. "Executive compensation and agency costs in Germany," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(7), pages 1391-1410, July.
    9. Taye Mengistae & Lixin Colin Xu, 2004. "Agency Theory and Executive Compensation: The Case of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(3), pages 615-638, July.
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    11. Kato, Takao & Long, Cheryl, 2006. "Executive Compensation, Firm Performance, and Corporate Governance in China: Evidence from Firms Listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(4), pages 945-983, July.
    12. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. " A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    13. Li Zhang & Shujun Ding, 2006. "The effect of increased disclosure on cost of capital: Evidence from China," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 383-401, December.
    14. Donghui Li & Fariborz Moshirian & Peter Kien Pham & Jason Zein, 2006. "When Financial Institutions Are Large Shareholders: The Role of Macro Corporate Governance Environments," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(6), pages 2975-3007, December.
    15. Vafeas, Nikos & Waegelein, James F & Papamichael, Maria, 2003. "The Response of Commercial Banks to Compensation Reform," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 335-354, June.
    16. Del Guercio, Diane & Dann, Larry Y. & Partch, M. Megan, 2003. "Governance and boards of directors in closed-end investment companies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 111-152, July.
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    20. David Blackwell & Donna Dudney & Kathleen Farrell, 2007. "Changes in CEO compensation structure and the impact on firm performance following CEO turnover," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 315-338, October.
    21. Yeh, Yin-Hua & Lee, Tsun-siou & Pen, Jen-fu, 2002. "Stock Returns and Volatility under Market Segmentation: The Case of Chinese A and B Shares," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 239-257, May.
    22. Theodore Groves & Yongmiao Hong & John McMillan & Barry Naughton, 1994. "Autonomy and Incentives in Chinese State Enterprises," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(1), pages 183-209.
    23. Jay C. Hartzell & Laura T. Starks, 2003. "Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(6), pages 2351-2374, December.
    24. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2001. "Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 116(3), pages 901-932.
    25. Groves, Theodore & Yongmiao Hong & John McMillan & Barry Naughton, 1995. "China's Evolving Managerial Labor Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(4), pages 873-892, August.
    26. Eisenberg, Theodore & Sundgren, Stefan & Wells, Martin T., 1998. "Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 35-54, April.
    27. Liu, Deqiang & Otsuka, Keijiro, 2004. "A Comparison of Management Incentives, Abilities, and Efficiency between SOEs and TVEs: The Case of the Iron and Steel Industry in China," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(4), pages 759-780, July.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Mamatzakis, Emmanuel & Xu, Bingrun, 2017. "Does corporate governance matter in fund management company: the case of china," MPRA Paper 76138, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Shujun Ding & Chunxin Jia & Craig Wilson & Zhenyu Wu, 2015. "Political connections and agency conflicts: the roles of owner and manager political influence on executive compensation," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 407-434, August.
    3. Shujun Ding & Chunxin Jia & Zhenyu Wu, 2016. "Mutual Fund Activism and Market Regulation During the Pre-IFRS Period: The Case of Earnings Informativeness in China from an Ethical Perspective," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 138(4), pages 765-785, November.
    4. Ran, Guanggui & Fang, Qiaoling & Luo, Shuai & Chan, Kam C., 2015. "Supervisory board characteristics and accounting information quality: Evidence from China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 18-32.
    5. Lars Helge Haß & Sofia Johan & Denis Schweizer, 2016. "Is Corporate Governance in China Related to Performance Persistence?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 134(4), pages 575-592, April.
    6. Shan, Yuan George, 2015. "Value relevance, earnings management and corporate governance in China," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 186-207.
    7. James Cordeiro & Lerong He & Martin Conyon & Tara Shaw, 2013. "Informativeness of performance measures and Chinese executive compensation," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 1031-1058, December.
    8. Ning, Lutao & Kuo, Jing-Ming & Strange, Roger & Wang, Boya, 2014. "International investors’ reactions to cross-border acquisitions by emerging market multinationals," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 811-823.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Supervisory boards; Legal approach; Executive compensation; G34; G38; M4;

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • M4 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting

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