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Citations for "Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: Does the Timing of Contributions Matter?"

by Stratmann, Thomas

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  1. Peter Grajzl & Peter Murrell, 2006. "Lawyers and politicians: the impact of organized legal professions on institutional reforms," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 251-276, December.
  2. Callahan, Scott, 2016. "The Impact of Agricultural Political Action Committee Donations on Repeated Farm Bill Votes," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, 2016, Boston, Massachusetts 235558, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
  3. Shaun M. Tanger & Richard Alan Seals Jr. & David N. Laband, 2011. "Does Bill Co-sponsorship Affect Campaign Contributions?: Evidence from the U.S. House of Representatives, 2000-2008," Auburn Economics Working Paper Series auwp2011-09, Department of Economics, Auburn University.
  4. Ansolabehere, Stephen & De Figueiredo, John M. & Snyder, James M., 2003. "Are Campaign Contributions Investment in the Political Marketplace or Individual Consumption? Or "Why Is There So Little Money in Politics?"," Working papers 4272-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  5. John Gilbert & Reza Oladi, 2012. "Net campaign contributions, agricultural interests, and votes on liberalizing trade with China," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 745-769, March.
  6. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 2000. "Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms," CRSP working papers 512, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
  7. Jordi Blanes i Vidal & Mirko Draca & Christian Fons-Rosen, 2012. "Revolving Door Lobbyists," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(7), pages 3731-48, December.
  8. Etienne Farvaque & Gael Lagadec, 2009. "Electoral Control when Policies are for Sale," CESifo Working Paper Series 2522, CESifo Group Munich.
  9. Stijn Claessens & Erik Feijen & Luc Laeven, 2006. "Does Campaign Finance imply Political Favors?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-002/2, Tinbergen Institute.
  10. Dana L. Hoag & Thomas G. Field, 1999. "Political and Economic Factors Affecting Agricultural PAC Contribution Strategies," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 81(2), pages 397-407.
  11. Stratmann, Thomas, 1998. "The Market for Congressional Votes: Is Timing of Contributions Everything?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 85-113, April.
  12. Elisabeth R. Gerber & Jeffrey B. Lewis, 2004. "Beyond the Median: Voter Preferences, District Heterogeneity, and Political Representation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(6), pages 1364-1383, December.
  13. Jeffrey Harden & Thomas Carsey, 2012. "Balancing constituency representation and party responsiveness in the US Senate: the conditioning effect of state ideological heterogeneity," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 137-154, January.
  14. Thomas Stratmann, 2005. "Some talk: Money in politics. A (partial) review of the literature," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 135-156, July.
  15. Mariano Tommasi & Matias Iaryczower & Pablo T. Spiller, 2004. "Judicial Lobbying: The Politics of Labor Law, Constitutional Interpretation. Argentina 1935-1998," Working Papers 73, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Jun 2004.
  16. Stadelmann, David & Portmann, Marco & Eichenberger, Reiner, 2013. "Quantifying parliamentary representation of constituents’ preferences with quasi-experimental data," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 170-180.
  17. Kevin Henrickson & Wesley Wilson, 2013. "Voting, Regulation, and the Railroad Industry: An Analysis of Private and Public Interest Voting Patterns," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 43(1), pages 21-39, August.
  18. Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, 2000. "Does Political Ambiguity Pay? Corporate Campaign Contributions and the Rewards to Legislator Reputation," NBER Working Papers 7475, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  19. Potters, J.J.M. & Sloof, R., 1996. "Interest groups : A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," Other publications TiSEM ff27d5d8-f584-4386-a1fc-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  20. David Stadelmann & Marco Portmann & Reiner Eichenberger, 2012. "Do Female Representatives Adhere More Closely to Citizens’ Preferences Than Male Representatives?," CREMA Working Paper Series 2012-02, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
  21. Thomas Stratmann, 2006. "Contribution limits and the effectiveness of campaign spending," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 461-474, December.
  22. Thomas Stratmann, 2003. "Tainted Money? Contribution Limits and the Effectiveness of Campaign Spending," CESifo Working Paper Series 1044, CESifo Group Munich.
  23. Claessens, Stijn & Feijen, Erik & Laeven, Luc, 2008. "Political connections and preferential access to finance: The role of campaign contributions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3), pages 554-580, June.
  24. Marco Portmann & David Stadelmann & Reiner Eichenberger, 2012. "District magnitude and representation of the majority’s preferences: Evidence from popular and parliamentary votes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 585-610, June.
  25. Tahoun, Ahmed, 2014. "The role of stock ownership by US members of Congress on the market for political favors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 86-110.
  26. Noel Johnson & Courtney LaFountain & Steven Yamarik, 2011. "Corruption is bad for growth (even in the United States)," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 377-393, June.
  27. Ulrich Matter & Michaela Slotwinski, 2016. "Precise Control over Legislative Vote Outcomes: A Forensic Approach to Political Economics," CESifo Working Paper Series 6007, CESifo Group Munich.
  28. Kroszner, Randall S & Stratmann, Thomas, 2005. "Corporate Campaign Contributions, Repeat Giving, and the Rewards to Legislator Reputation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(1), pages 41-71, April.
  29. Yeh, Yin-Hua & Shu, Pei-Gi & Chiu, Shean-Bii, 2013. "Political connections, corporate governance and preferential bank loans," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1079-1101.
  30. Noel Johnson & William Ruger & Jason Sorens & Steven Yamarik, 2014. "Corruption, regulation, and growth: an empirical study of the United States," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 51-69, February.
  31. Chen, Hui & Parsley, David & Yang, Ya-wen, 2010. "Corporate Lobbying and Financial Performance," MPRA Paper 21114, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  32. Unsal, Omer & Hassan, M. Kabir & Zirek, Duygu, 2016. "Corporate lobbying, CEO political ideology and firm performance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 126-149.
  33. Marco Portmann & David Stadelmann & Reiner Eichenberger, 2010. "District Magnitude and Representation of the Majority?s Preferences: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Popular and Parliamentary Votes," CREMA Working Paper Series 2010-13, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
  34. Thomas Stratmann & Francisco J. & Aparicio-Castillo, 2006. "Competition policy for elections: Do campaign contribution limits matter?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 177-206, April.
  35. Reiner Eichenberger & David Stadelmann & Marco Portmann, 2012. "A comparative analysis of the voting behavior of constituents and their representatives for public debts," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 244-260, September.
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