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Citations for "Delegation as Commitment: The Case of Income Tax Audits"

by Nahum D. Melumad & Dilip Mookherjee

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  1. Hsiao-Chi Chen & Shi-Miin Liu, 2005. "Dynamic Incentive Contracts under No-Commitment to Periodic Auditing and a Non-retrospective Penalty System," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 85(2), pages 107-139, 08.
  2. J. Atsu Amegashie & Edward Kutsoati, 2005. "(Non)Intervention In Intra-State Conflicts," Working Papers 0504, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
  3. Persons, John C., 1997. "Liars Never Prosper? How Management Misrepresentation Reduces Monitoring Costs," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 269-306, October.
  4. Ying Yan, 1997. "Credit rationing, bankruptcy cost, and the optimal debt contract for small business," Working Paper 9702, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  5. Debra J. Aron & Paul Olivella, 1991. "Bonuses and Penalties as Equilibrium Incentive Devices, with Application to Manufacturing Systems," Discussion Papers 932, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. Strausz, Roland, 2004. "Buried in Paperwork: Excessive Reporting in Organizations," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 27, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  7. Kessler, Anke & Lülfesmann, Christoph & Schmitz, Patrick W, 2002. "Optimal Contracting in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 3428, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Georges Dionne & Florence Giuliano & Pierre Picard, 2005. "Optimal Auditing with Scoring Theory and Application to Insurance Fraud," Working Papers hal-00243026, HAL.
  9. Lohmann, Susanne & Hopenhayn, Hugo, 1998. "Delegation and the Regulation of Risk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 222-246, May.
  10. Thomas Kirchmaier & Mariano Selvaggi, 2006. "The dark side of 'good' corporate governance: compliance-fuelled book-cooking activities," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24513, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  11. Picard, Pierre, 1996. "Auditing claims in the insurance market with fraud: The credibility issue," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 27-56, December.
  12. Pinje, Jori Veng & Boserup, Simon Halphen, 2011. "Tax evasion, information reporting, and the regressive bias hypothesis," MPRA Paper 28406, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. Martin Besfamille & Cecilia Parlatore Siritto, 2009. "Modernization of Tax Administrations and Optimal Fiscal Policies," Department of Economics Working Papers 2009-07, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
  14. Bénédicte Coestier & Nathalie Fombaron, 2003. "L'audit en assurance," THEMA Working Papers 2003-41, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  15. BOADWAY, Robin & MARCHAND, Maurice & SATO, Motohiro, 2003. "An optimal contract approach to hospital financing," CORE Discussion Papers 2003021, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  16. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00195354 is not listed on IDEAS
  17. Georges Dionne & Florence Giuliano & Pierre Picard, 2003. "Optimal Auditing for Insurance Fraud," Cahiers de recherche 0329, CIRPEE.
  18. Lang, Matthias & Wambach, Achim, 2013. "The fog of fraud – Mitigating fraud by strategic ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 255-275.
  19. Chongwoo Choe, 1995. "Contract Design and Costly Verification Games," Working Papers 1995.18, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
  20. Saha, Atanu & Poole, Graham, 2000. "The economics of crime and punishment: An analysis of optimal penalty," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 191-196, August.
  21. Khalil, Fahad & Lawarree, Jacques, 2001. "Catching the agent on the wrong foot: ex post choice of monitoring," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 327-347, December.
  22. Boccard, Nicolas & Legros, Patrick, 2002. "Audit Competition in Insurance Oligopolies," CEPR Discussion Papers 3478, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  23. Kalina Koleva, 2005. "A la recherche de l'administration fiscale optimale : l'approche par les coûts d'efficience," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques r05050, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
  24. Jost, Peter-J., 1997. "Regulatory enforcement in the presence of a court system," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 491-508, December.
  25. Itoh, Hideshi, 2001. "Job design and incentives in hierarchies with team production," Hitotsubashi Journal of commerce and management, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 36(1), pages 1-17, January.
  26. Jost, Peter-J., 1995. "Disclosure of Information and Incentives for Care," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 65-85, January.
  27. Bose, Pinaki, 1995. "Regulatory errors, optimal fines and the level of compliance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 475-484, March.
  28. Roider, Andreas, 2007. "Risk, Delegation, and Project Scope," IZA Discussion Papers 3117, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  29. Kessler, Anke S., 2000. "On Monitoring and Collusion in Hierarchies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 280-291, April.
  30. Sato, Hideki, 2011. "Raising Wages as a Strategy to Reduce Corruption," MPRA Paper 45688, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  31. Gatsios, Konstantine & Karp, Larry, 1995. "Delegation in a general equilibrium model of customs unions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 319-333, February.
  32. Narayanan, V. G. & Davila, Antonio, 1998. "Using delegation and control systems to mitigate the trade-off between the performance-evaluation and belief-revision uses of accounting signals," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 255-282, June.
  33. Meng-Yu Liang & C.C. Yang, 2007. "On the Budget-Constrained IRS: Equilibrium and Equilibrium and efficiency," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 07-A002, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
  34. Eduardo Zilberman, 2011. "Audits or Distortions: The Optimal Scheme to Enforce Self-Employment Income Taxes," Textos para discussão 590, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil).
  35. Langberg, Nisan, 2008. "Optimal financing for growth firms," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 379-406, July.
  36. Kuhn, Michael & Siciliani, Luigi, 2013. "Manipulation and auditing of public sector contracts," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 251-267.
  37. Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1989. "Limited commitment and costly enforcement," Working Paper 90-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  38. Parkash Chander, 2004. "Risk Aversion and Income Tax Enforcement," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 531, Econometric Society.
  39. Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, 2000. "Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration," NBER Working Papers 7473, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  40. Cremer, Helmuth & Gahvari, Firouz, 1996. "Tax evasion and the optimum general income tax," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 235-249, May.
  41. Finkle, Aaron & Shin, Dongsoo, 2007. "Conducting inaccurate audits to commit to the audit policy," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 379-389, April.
  42. Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongrain, 2000. "Amnesties and Co-operation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 259-273, May.
  43. Lulfesmann, Christoph, 2002. "Partial monitoring, adverse selection, and the internal efficiency of the firm," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(8), pages 1097-1118, October.
  44. Nobuo Yoshida, 2000. "The Optimal Combination of Corruption Reforms: Is a Comprehensive Approach a Good Idea?," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1335, Econometric Society.
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