IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/fip/fedmsr/283.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

Public trust and government betrayal

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Ekmekci, Mehmet & Gossner, Olivier & Wilson, Andrea, 2012. "Impermanent types and permanent reputations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 162-178.
  2. Manuel Amador & Christopher Phelan, 2021. "Reputation and Sovereign Default," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(4), pages 1979-2010, July.
  3. Pablo Ottonello & Diego J. Perez, 2019. "The Currency Composition of Sovereign Debt," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 174-208, July.
  4. Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(2), pages 407-432, March.
  5. Johannes Horner & Takuo Sugaya & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2009. "Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for delta Approaching 1 and a Folk Theorem," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1742, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Aug 2010.
  6. Johannes Horner & Takuo Sugaya & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2010. "Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for ! ! 1 and a Folk Theorem," Working Papers 1264, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
  7. Wiseman, Thomas, 2008. "Reputation and impermanent types," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 190-210, January.
  8. Cripps, Martin W. & Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2007. "Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 287-316, May.
  9. Johannes Hörner & Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2010. "On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 58(4-part-2), pages 1107-1115, August.
  10. Krzysztof Makarski, 2014. "Dollarization as a signaling device," Bank i Kredyt, Narodowy Bank Polski, vol. 45(1), pages 17-36.
  11. Liu, Qingmin & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2014. "Limited records and reputation bubbles," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 2-29.
  12. Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky, 2012. "Cycles of Distrust: An Economic Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000502, David K. Levine.
  13. Lu, Yang K., 2013. "Optimal policy with credibility concerns," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2007-2032.
  14. Jacek Rothert, 2015. "Monitoring, moral hazard, and turnover," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(2), pages 355-374, February.
  15. Timothy J. Kehoe & Juan Pablo Nicolini & Thomas J. Sargent, 2020. "A Framework for Studying the Monetary and Fiscal History of Latin America, 1960–2017," Staff Report 607, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  16. Pierre Cardaliaguet & Catherine Rainer & Dinah Rosenberg & Nicolas Vieille, 2016. "Markov Games with Frequent Actions and Incomplete Information—The Limit Case," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 41(1), pages 49-71, February.
  17. Sperisen, Benjamin, 2018. "Bounded memory and incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 382-400.
  18. Kolb, Aaron & Conitzer, Vincent, 2020. "Crying about a strategic wolf: A theory of crime and warning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
  19. Li, Ming & Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2009. "Credibility for Sale: the Effect of Disclosure on Information Acquisition and Transmission," Working Papers 09008, Concordia University, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2009.
  20. Luis Cabral & Ali Hortacsu, 2004. "The Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Theory and Evidence from eBay," NBER Working Papers 10363, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. David K. Levine, 2021. "The Reputation Trap," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(6), pages 2659-2678, November.
  22. Akhtaruzzaman, M. & Berg, Nathan & Hajzler, Christopher, 2017. "Expropriation risk and FDI in developing countries: Does return of capital dominate return on capital?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 84-107.
  23. Ehud Lehrer & Dimitry Shaiderman, 2022. "Markovian Persuasion with Stochastic Revelations," Papers 2204.08659, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
  24. Schaumburg, Ernst & Tambalotti, Andrea, 2007. "An investigation of the gains from commitment in monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 302-324, March.
  25. Krzysztof Makarski & Joanna Tyrowicz, 2015. "Political (In)Stability of Social Security Reform," Working Papers 2015-21, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw.
  26. Sleet, Christopher & Yeltekin, Sevin, 2007. "Recursive monetary policy games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 1557-1583, May.
  27. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2015. "Reputations in Repeated Games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
  28. Qingmin Liu, 2006. "Information Acquisition and Reputation Dynamics," Discussion Papers 06-030, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  29. Robert G. King & Yang K. Lu & Ernesto S. Past…N, 2008. "Managing Expectations," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(8), pages 1625-1666, December.
  30. Hugo Benitez-Silva & Debra S. Dwyer & Frank Heiland & Warren C. Sanderson, 2006. "Retirement and Social Security Reform Expectations: A Solution to the New Early Retirement Puzzle," Department of Economics Working Papers 06-05, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
  31. Hakenes, Hendrik & Katolnik, Svetlana, 2017. "On the incentive effects of job rotation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 424-441.
  32. Ehud Lehrer & Dimitry Shaiderman, 2021. "Markovian Persuasion," Papers 2111.14365, arXiv.org.
  33. Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2011. "Sustainable reputations with rating systems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 479-503, March.
  34. Leonardo Felli & Alessandro Riboni & Luca Anderlini, 2007. "Statute Law or Case Law?," 2007 Meeting Papers 952, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  35. Harry Pei, 2020. "Reputation Building under Observational Learning," Papers 2006.08068, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2020.
  36. Juan Passadore & Juan Xandri, 2019. "Robust Predictions in Dynamic Policy Games," 2019 Meeting Papers 1345, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  37. Escobar, Juan F. & Llanes, Gastón, 2018. "Cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 408-443.
  38. Oh, Hyungna & Hong, Jong Ho, 2012. "Citizens’ trust in government and their willingness-to-pay," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(3), pages 345-347.
  39. Elias Aptus & Volker Britz & Hans Gersbach, 2020. "Crisis Contracts," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(1), pages 121-164, July.
  40. Christopher Hajzler & Jonathan Rosborough, 2016. "Government Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment Under the Threat of Expropriation," Staff Working Papers 16-13, Bank of Canada.
  41. Ceyhun Elgin & Hasan kadir Tosun, 2017. "A note on informality and public trust," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 37(4), pages 2595-2601.
  42. Beetsma, Roel & Komada, Oliwia & Makarski, Krzysztof & Tyrowicz, Joanna, 2021. "The political (in)stability of funded social security," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).
  43. repec:dau:papers:123456789/7720 is not listed on IDEAS
  44. Johannes Hörner & Nicolas S Lambert, 2021. "Motivational Ratings [Toward the Next Generation of Recommender Systems: A Survey of the State-of-the-Art and Possible Extensions]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(4), pages 1892-1935.
  45. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Alessandro Riboni, 2014. "Why Stare Decisis?," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 17(4), pages 726-738, October.
  46. Harry Pei, 2020. "Trust and Betrayals: Reputational Payoffs and Behaviors without Commitment," Papers 2006.08071, arXiv.org.
  47. Alp E. Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci, 2012. "Reputation in Long-Run Relationships," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(2), pages 451-480.
  48. Renault, Jérôme & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2013. "Dynamic sender–receiver games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 502-534.
  49. Johannes Horner & Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2009. "On a Markov Game with One-Sided Incomplete Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1737, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  50. Hortacsu, Ali, 2005. "Trust and Reputation on eBay: Micro and Macro Perspectives," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt8vj7d50q, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  51. Christian Moser & Pierre Yared, 2022. "Pandemic Lockdown: The Role of Government Commitment," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 46, pages 27-50, October.
  52. Martin, Fernando M., 2010. "Markov-perfect capital and labor taxes," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 503-521, March.
  53. Drew Fudenberg & Ying Gao & Harry Pei, 2020. "A Reputation for Honesty," Papers 2011.07159, arXiv.org.
  54. Yingkai Li & Harry Pei, 2020. "Equilibrium Behaviors in Repeated Games," Papers 2007.14002, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2021.
  55. Dilmé, Francesc, 2019. "Reputation building through costly adjustment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 586-626.
  56. Cai, Hongbin & Jin, Ginger Zhe & Liu, Chong & Zhou, Li-an, 2014. "Seller reputation: From word-of-mouth to centralized feedback," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 51-65.
  57. Wren-Lewis, Liam, 2013. "Commitment in utility regulation: A model of reputation and policy applications," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 210-231.
  58. Heski Bar-Isaac & Joyee Deb, 2012. "Reputation for a Servant of Two Masters," Working Papers 12-08, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  59. Christopher Clayton & Amanda Dos Santos & Matteo Maggiori & Jesse Schreger, 2022. "Internationalizing Like China," NBER Working Papers 30336, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  60. Cabral, Luís, 2016. "Media exposure and corporate reputation," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(4), pages 735-740.
  61. Konstantin Egorov & Michal Fabinger, 2016. "Reputational Effects in Sovereign Default," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-999, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  62. Heski Bar-Isaac Jr. & Joyee Deb Jr., 2014. "(Good and Bad) Reputation for a Servant of Two Masters," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 293-325, November.
  63. Mwoya Byaro & Abel Kinyondo, 2020. "Citizens' Trust in Government and Their Greater Willingness to Pay Taxes in Tanzania: A Case Study of Mtwara, Lindi, and Dar es Salaam Regions," Poverty & Public Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 12(1), pages 73-83, March.
  64. John E. Anderson, 2017. "Trust in Government and Willingness to Pay Taxes in Transition Countries," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 59(1), pages 1-22, March.
  65. Harry Pei, 2022. "Reputation Effects under Short Memories," Papers 2207.02744, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.
  66. Larry Samuelson, 2003. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000030, UCLA Department of Economics.
  67. Li, Yingkai & Pei, Harry, 2021. "Equilibrium behaviors in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
  68. Christian Moser & Pierre Yared, 2022. "Pandemic Lockdown: The Role of Government Commitment," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 46, pages 27-50, October.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.